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A MINOR EXCEPTION?: THE IMPACT OF
LA WRENCE V. TEXAS ON LGBT YOUTH
JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
In our nation's cities, tens of thousands of teenagers live on the
streets.1 In major urban centers like New York, San Francisco, and
Chicago, up to half of all of these teens may self-identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender (LGBT). Nationally, between eleven and forty
* J.D. Candidate 2007, Northwestern University School of Law; Master in Public Policy
Candidate 2007, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. I would like
to thank Professor Susan Provenzano, Kim Hawkins, Sarah Schriber, Peter Friedman, and
my comment editors, Matt Lyon and Betsy Judelson, for their thoughtful suggestions and
feedback on drafts of this comment. Special thanks to the staff of the Urban Justice Center's
Peter Cicchino Youth Project for advocating for the rights of LGBT youth and providing me
the opportunity to join them in their work in summer 2005.
1 Estimates of the incidence of youth homelessness vary, but considerable numbers of
youth annually experience short- or long-term homelessness due to running away or being
kicked out of their homes. A Department of Justice report estimated that in 1999 nearly 1.7
million youth had a runaway or "throwaway" episodes 71 percent of whom were at
significant risk of physical harm during that period of homelessness. See HEATHER
HAMMER, DAVID FINKELHOR & ANDREA J. SEDLAK, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RUNAwAY/THROWNAWAY CHILDREN:
NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 5-6 (2002), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojjdp/196469.pdf. Other studies have estimated that up to 2.8
million youth have experienced homelessness. See Bob Reeg, The Runaway and Homeless
Youth Act and Disconnected Youth, in LEAVE No YOUTH BEHIND: OPPORTUNITIES FOR
CONGRESS TO REACH DISCONNECTED YOUTH 53, 56 (Jodie Levin-Epstein & Mark H.
Greenberg eds., 2003), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/
Disconnected Youth.pdf.
2 JASON CIANCIOTTO & SEAN CAHILL, NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY
INST., EDUCATION POLICY: ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
YOUTH 24 (2003), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/ educationpolicy.pdf;
RANDI FEINSTEIN ET AL., JUSTICE FOR ALL?: A REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDERED YOUTH IN THE NEW YORK JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 17-18 (2001),
available at http://www.urbanjustice.org/publications/pdfs/lesbianandgay/
justiceforallreport.pdf. In New York City, for example, up to 50 percent of homeless youth
self-identify as LGBT. Jenny Casciano et al., Client-Centered Advocacy on Behalf of At-
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percent of homeless youth are thought to be LGBT.3 Like their non-LGBT
counterparts in the homeless population, most homeless LGBT youth have
been kicked out of or have run away from home, frequently cycling through
the child welfare and foster care systems.4 Many have been abused or
harassed by parents, family members, child welfare workers and foster
parents, and even classmates and teachers.5
Consequently, for many homeless LGBT youth, the only "safe" space
they can find is on the streets. 6 Not surprisingly, homelessness exposes
LGBT youth to a host of troubling problems, including increased risk of
becoming victims of crime and assault,7 as well as a greater likelihood of
committing crimes themselves-like theft, prostitution, and drug dealing-
in order to survive. They also face police harassment for minor infractions
like loitering, public drinking, or subway turnstile jumping-or for nothing
at all.9 Committing such offenses may usher them back into the same
system that failed them the first time.'0 LGBT youth offenders' experiences
in the juvenile justice system-when they are arrested, tried in juvenile
court, sentenced, and ultimately incarcerated-are plagued by intentional
and unintentional discrimination because of their real or perceived sexual
orientation. 1
Risk LGBT Youth, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 221, 231 (2001) (quoting a New York
City legal advodate for LGBT youth).
3 Bryan N. Cochran et al., Challenges Faced by Homeless Sexual Minorities:
Comparison of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Homeless Adolescents with Their
Heterosexual Counterparts, 92 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 773, 773 (2002); FEINsTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 17-18; Laurie Schaffner, Violence and Female Delinquency: Gender
Transgressions and Gender Invisibility, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 40, 61 (1999).
4 See infra Part II.A.3.
5 Id.
6 See generally FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 11-20; Colleen A. Sullivan, Kids,
Courts & Queers: Lesbian & Gay Youth in the Juvenile Justice and Foster Care Systems, 6
LAW& SEXUALITY 31 (1996).
7 See Cochran et al., supra note 3, at 773 (noting that homeless young people are at high
risk of robbery, rape, and assault).
8 See infra Part II.A.3.
9 See, e.g., Casciano et al., supra note 2, at 223-24.
10 See FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 11, 18-20; Miriam Aviva Friedland, Too Close
to the Edge: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in the Child Welfare System, 3
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 777, 794-95 (2002); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 40-41.
1 See generally FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 25-41 (describing the discrimination,
lack of institutional awareness, and harassment that LGBT youth face in sentencing and
detention in the New York juvenile justice system); Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for
Puppy Love: Institutionalized Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered
Youth, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 429 (1998); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 46-47.
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While at-risk and disenfranchised LGBT youth continue to face severe
discrimination-in their homes, schools, child welfare placements, and the
juvenile justice system-the gay and lesbian community as a whole
achieved a significant legal advance in its quest for equality in the United
States Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,12 which
invalidated states' statutory prohibitions of homosexual sodomy.
13
Generally considered the most gay-friendly decision ever issued by the
Court, many commentators view Lawrence as a tall stepping-stone toward
increased legal and social equality for sexual minorities. 14 The immediate
effect of Lawrence was to decriminalize sexual conduct between
individuals of the same sex-itself a historic, landmark advance for gays
and lesbians. By finding that sodomy statutes violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 15 however, the Court acknowledged
that its decision extended beyond only legalizing gay sex.16 The decision
also lifted a major legal stigma associated with being homosexual.' 7 As
12 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13 Id. The state statute at issue, the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law, only banned same-
sex sodomy, but not opposite-sex sodomy. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (1994) ("A
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex."). Other state sodomy statutes facially applied to both
homosexual and heterosexual couples, although as enforced, sodomy statutes were rarely
enforced against consenting adults and were commonly known to be proscriptions only on
homosexual sex, or as a secondary tool to prosecute other crimes, like prostitution, child
molestation, and sex with animals. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569-71, 573 ("Laws
prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in
private. A substantial number of sodomy prosecutions and convictions for which there are
surviving records were for predatory acts against those who could not or did not consent, as
in the case of a minor or the victim of an assault.").
14 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (2004) ("As
had been widely expected among legal experts, the Court overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick .... No one, however, anticipated the breadth of the Court's opinion.") (footnote
omitted); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1401 ("While it was widely expected that the Court would find the
Texas sodomy law unconstitutional, the sweeping-indeed moving-language that Justice
Kennedy uses in the majority's opinion came as quite a surprise.... This soaring language
recognizes the dignity and respect that gay men and lesbians are due.").
15 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
16 Id. at 567 (noting that although the challenged sodomy laws "purport to do no more
than prohibit a particular sexual act[, t]heir penalties and purposes ... have more far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and
in the most private of places, the home").
17 Id. at 575. The majority itself recognized the stigmatizing effect of criminal laws,
stating, "[wihen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination
both in the public and in the private spheres" and that the Court's prior decision in Bowers,
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long as sodomy statutes remained on the books, gay and lesbian adults bore
the presumption of criminality because of the illegality of the sexual acts
associated with their sexual identity.18  Laurence Tribe has noted that
Lawrence lifted this stigma of criminalization from all gays and lesbians,
writing:
Lawrence quickly becomes a story about how the very fact of criminalization, even
unaccompanied by any appreciable number of prosecutions, can cast already
misunderstood or despised individuals into grossly stereotyped roles.... The
outlawed acts... come to represent human identities, and this reductionist conflation
of ostracized identity with outlawed act in turn reinforces the vicious cycle of
distancing and stigma that preserves the equilibrium of oppression .... 19
This presumption remained alive and well until June 2003, when with
the abolition of sodomy statutes, gays and lesbians were able to shed-as
individuals and as a community-this subjugated outlaw status.20 For the
first time, being gay was not a criminal act.
In decriminalizing gay and lesbian adults' sexual behavior,21 the
Supreme Court effectively legitimized the status of being gay. The sex act
had been used for so long to define gay people solely by the "criminal" sex
upholding such laws "demeans the lives of homosexual persons," concluding, "[t]he stigma
this criminal statute imposes.., is not trivial." Id.
18 See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
"Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) (describing how "the
very existence of sodomy laws creates a criminal class of gay men and lesbians, who are
consequently targeted for violence, harassment, and discrimination because of their criminal
status"). While sodomy statutes remained constitutional, courts used this presumption of
criminality to deny LGBT people certain rights. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d
102, 107-08 (Va. 1995) (denying child custody to a lesbian mother, in part, because the
"[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism" is 'illegal,' and constitutes a felony"); see also Ruthann
Robson, The Missing Word in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 397, 404-08
(2004) (describing other instances in which sodomy statutes were held by courts to justify
discrimination against gays and lesbians).
19 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not
SpeakIts Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893, 1896 (2004).
20 In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor discussed this presumption
of criminality, writing "the effect of Texas' sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of
prosecution or consequence of conviction. Texas' sodomy law brands all homosexuals as
criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner
as everyone else." 539 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Though most states had
already abolished sodomy bans prior to 2003, the remaining sodomy laws still justified
discrimination against all LGBT people. Id. at 570-71. Moreover, for those individuals
actually convicted of sodomy, a permanent criminal record and its attendant disadvantages
would attach to them, both in their home states and in others recognizing other states'
criminal convictions. Id. at 575-76.
21 Id. at 578-79.
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in which they were likely to engage.22 Through Lawrence, the gay
community was able to toss off that reductionist shackle-and to define
itself more wholly in terms of the full range of emotions, attractions, and,
indeed, sexual preferences, that constitute the core human identity of a gay
or lesbian person.23
Unfortunately, for many LGBT young people, their sexual identity still
bears the stigma of criminality.24 Correctly interpreted, Lawrence should,
however, offer relief both to adult gays and lesbians and to the most
marginalized, invisible, and ill-treated subpopulation of the LGBT
community-its homeless and incarcerated youth. Lawrence bolsters the
Court's previous holding in Romer v. Evans25 that a more searching form of
rational basis review is required when addressing discriminatory policies
targeted against LGBT people as a group.26 Since Lawrence, however,
some courts have misunderstood and wrongly applied one seven-word
phrase in Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion, "[t]he present case
22 See Leslie, supra note 18.
23 See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1025 ("[T]raditionalists can no longer deploy the state
to hurt gay people or render them presumptive criminals .. "); Tribe, supra note 19, at
1948-51 (rejecting the narrow view that Lawrence only legalized private homosexual sex, in
favor of a broader interpretation that the decision renders illegitimate many forms of state-
sanctioned discrimination against gays based on their former criminal status).
24 As this comment will discuss later, see infra Part II.A.2., the cycle of events that leads
LGBT youth into the homeless population and juvenile justice system often starts with
trouble at home caused when the youth comes out as LGBT, is "outed" to his or her parents,
or exhibits gender non-conforming behavior that leads to physical and verbal abuse, ejection
from the home, or both. Simply stated, "being gay" instigates this cycle, not any criminal
behavior on the part of the youth. Nevertheless, as these young people continue to face
discrimination within the system and their options become more limited, homelessness can
often seem like the last resort. Non-violent survival crimes are thus related more to their
sexual orientation or gender-role conformity than to any propensity for crime, Although, of
course, being gay or lesbian does not make one a per se criminal, for those LGBT
adolescents who reach the juvenile justice system, their delinquent behavior is linked to past
discrimination and harassment based on their sexual orientation or gender expression. See
FENSTErN ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 ("[T]he crimes that LGBT youth commit are often
directly tied to their emotional or physical needs stemming from rejection based on sexual
orientation or gender identity.").
2' 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
26 Id. at 634-36 (holding that "a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest" and finding unconstitutional a state law that
"classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else"). Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence, referred to the
Court's reasoning in Romer and other equal protection cases, noting, "[w]hen a law exhibits
such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form
of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause." 539
U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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does not involve minors, 27 which this comment will refer to as "the minor
exception." This phrase has been incorrectly interpreted to limit the reach
of Lawrence by excluding LGBT youth from the decision's scope, since its
proper application is to preclude adult sex offenders from seeking a liberty
interest to engage in sexual conduct with children-an issue unrelated to
28sexual orientation. Further, although the Court in Lawrence recognized
that gays and lesbians are a distinct class of people who face societal
discrimination, it failed to take the next step and conclusively hold that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification for purposes of constitutional
review.29 Under this narrow view, by just decriminalizing the sex act, but
not formally extending protections on the basis of sexual identity, it could
be argued that youth (and others) who are not sexually active may be found
to fall outside the scope of the holding.
The central questions posed by this comment are (1) how Lawrence
affected the status of sexual minority youth as a class, if at all; and (2)
whether the decision will be useful in seeking expanded legal protections
for at-risk LGBT youth. Since Lawrence, a judicial and public backlash
against LGBT rights has emerged.30 In 2004, voters in thirteen states
approved ballot measures creating state constitutional amendments banning
same-sex marriage.31 Several state and federal courts have issued decisions
narrowly construing Lawrence and attempting to restrict its scope, raising
questions of how other courts will apply Lawrence to cases involving
LGBT youth. This comment will argue that Lawrence decriminalized not
27 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
28 See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
29 Andrew Koppelman writes,
The Court determined that certain sexual privacies were protected, but it emphasized that "[t]he
petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense," and later emphasized that "[t]he
present case does not involve minors.".. . The Court did not hold that there was anything wrong
per se with classifications on the basis of sexual orientation, much less that discrimination
against gays was constitutionally suspect under the Equal Protection Clause ....
Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1173-74 (2004)
(alterations in original). Nevertheless, Koppelman notes that "Lawrence is full of language
that demonstrates the Court's concern with the subordination of gays as a group," such that
"all antigay laws are now under suspicion." 1d. at 1177, 1183.
30 See generally A. Jean Thomas, The Hard Edge of Kulturkampf: Cultural Violence,
Political Backlashes and Judicial Resistance to Lawrence and Brown, 23 QUINNIPIAC L.
REv. 707 (2004) (describing the political backlash to gay rights after Lawrence and
comparing it to the similar resistance to blacks' civil rights after the Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
31 NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, VOTING TALLIES: STATE ANTI-GAY MARRIAGE
BALLOT INITIATIVES (2005), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
StateBallotPollingData2004.pdf.
32 See infra Part III.B.
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just consensual sodomy between homosexual adults, but also the very status
of being gay or lesbian, and as such, should also be interpreted to include
gay youth in its protections.
Part II of this paper will describe the discrimination faced by LGBT
young people on the basis of their sexual identity, including special risks of
homelessness and exposure to the juvenile justice system; review empirical
data on children's sexual identity formation and contrast it with stereotypes
still used to abridge gay rights; and discuss courts' conceptions of the
existence and rights of LGBT youth prior to Lawrence.
Part III will argue that a correct reading of Lawrence should render any
discrimination against youth on the basis of sexual orientation
constitutionally suspect. Lawrence recognized that gays and lesbians are a
distinct class of citizens, whose liberty interests include the rights to realize
their human and sexual identity free from state-sanctioned interference
based on the majority's animus or ignorance. While it stops short of
labeling LGBT people a protected class in constitutional terms, the decision
implicitly recognizes that gay people are something more than the sexual
acts in which they engage. This comment will analyze two 2004 decisions,
Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children & Family Services33 in the
Eleventh Circuit and State v. Limon34 from the Kansas Court of Appeals,
both of which incorrectly construed Lawrence to categorically exclude
LGBT youth from any legal protections, relying on grounds Lawrence itself
made irrational. It will argue that the "minor exception" in the decision's
caveat paragraph cannot be read to justify discriminatory policies against
LGBT adults and minors.
This comment will conclude that Lawrence should be used by
advocates for LGBT youth who are homeless, at risk of entering the
juvenile justice system, or already confined in detention or prison facilities.
Specifically, policies, practices, and conditions of confinement that treat
LGBT youth differently and detrimentally do not, in light of Lawrence, bear
any rational relation to legitimate state interests.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court declared in Lawrence v. Texas35 that
state sodomy statutes violated gay and lesbian individuals' liberty interests
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  In
33 358 F.3d 804 (1 th Cir. 2004).
34 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, No. 85,898, 2005 WL 2675039 (Kan. Oct.
21, 2005).
" 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
36 Id. at 564.
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Lawrence, the Court overturned its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,37
in which the Court found such statutes constitutionally permissible and
rejected the gay plaintiffs' equal protection claims as "facetious. 38  In
reversing Bowers, the Court not only legalized same-sex sexual activity, but
also removed one of the most significant legally-sanctioned justifications
for discrimination against LGBT people as a class. 39  The Lawrence
decision, which implicitly recognized a growing social acceptance and
understanding of gays and lesbians,4° was issued during a historic moment
when LGBT youth were also starting to become increasingly visible in
communities across the country.
41
This section will first review the research on youth sexuality and the
cultural shifts which have led to LGBT youth acknowledging their
homosexuality or gender identity earlier than in generations past. Next, it
will discuss the still-pervasive discrimination against youth who are gay or
perceived to be gay, despite these positive cultural shifts. Third, it will
describe how this discrimination puts significant numbers of LGBT youth
at risk of entering the child welfare system, becoming homeless, engaging
in delinquent behavior, and entering the juvenile justice system. Finally, it
will analyze the pre-Lawrence legal context for LGBT youths' rights, and
discuss how courts have traditionally dealt with the existence of LGBT
youth and the problems faced by this marginalized subpopulation of the
LGBT population. Although Lawrence did not bear directly on LGBT
youth,42 the ways in which it has been interpreted in subsequent lower court
decisions have directly impacted LGBT minors. The long-term legacy of
Lawrence will be measured, in part, by whether it extends legal protections
against discrimination to homosexual and gender non-conforming minors.
37 Id. at 578 (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
38 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94, 196.
39 The Court itself acknowledged the lasting stigma imposed on LGBT people by
sodomy laws. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 ("The stigma this criminal statute imposes,
moreover, is not trivial."). A number of commentators have noted that since Bowers
reinforced a presumptive "outlaw" status on gays and lesbians, in overturning Bowers, social
stigmas based on the formerly presumed criminality will decline. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra
note 14, at 1022; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty. Affirmative
Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 39 (2005).
40 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573, 576-77; see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 1901-02.
41 Studies in the late 1990's found that the average age when gay and lesbian teenagers
self-identify was sixteen, compared to nineteen to twenty-three in the 1980s, and that LGBT
youth are voluntarily "coming out" as teenagers in increasing numbers. See CIANCIATTO &
CAHILL, supra note 2, at 6, 25.
42 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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A. LGBT YOUTH: AN INVISIBLE MINORITY WITHIN A MINORITY
1. Openly LGBT Young People Are Becoming Increasingly Visible in
Society
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender adolescents have long suffered
from legal and social invisibility.43  First, many LGBT teenagers-like
many LGBT adults-are not "obviously" gay, and parents, peers, teachers,
society, and courts tend to presume their heterosexuality.4 Indeed,
society's tendency to ignore or downplay juvenile sexuality in general leads
many to have trouble believing children can be gay.45 Second, many LGBT
teenagers have not come out to themselves and are still struggling with or
even just beginning to recognize their own sexual identity.4 Unlike
children in every other minority group, most gay teens' families are not also
gay.47  Whereas other minority children enjoy support in confronting
discrimination from their parents and communities-who share their
experiences-most LGBT adolescents lack a comparable built-in support
network.48 Consequently, LGBT youth frequently confront these issues
alone or, worse, lose family support when they come out as LGBT.49 Third,
43 See, e.g., FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 26-27 (discussing LGBT youths'
invisibility within the juvenile justice system); Arriola, supra note 11, at 430; Teemu
Ruskola, Minor Disregard. The Legal Construction of the Fantasy That Gay and Lesbian
Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269, 270-71 (1996).
44 See Vanessa H. Eisemann, Protecting the Kids in the Hall. Using Title 1X to Stop
Student-on-Student Anti-Gay Harassment, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 125, 149 (2000);
Ruskola, supra note 43, at 293.
45 See, e.g., Ruskola, supra note 43, at 274-75 ("The notion of juvenile sexuality is
fundamental to our notion of adolescence, yet we are constantly striving to desexualize
adolescents.... [A]ttempts to redefine or reinterpret juvenile sexuality often elicit reactions
bordering on hysteria.").
46 See Miye A. Goishi, Unlocking the Closet Door: Protecting Children from Involuntary
Civil Commitment Because of Their Sexual Orientation, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1137, 1159-60
(1997) (noting that gay adolescents typically receive less support than their peers in dealing
with sexual identity issues).
47 COLLEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., LAMBDA LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, YOUTH IN THE
MARGINS: A REPORT ON THE UNMET NEEDS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE 13-14 (2001), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/ cgi-
bin/iowa/news/publications.html?record=899 (noting that unlike other minority children,
LGBT youth do not typically grow up in families or communities that share their minority
status, who can "act as buffers against stigmatization and present affirming role models").
48 1d.; Sonia Renee Martin, Note, A Child's Right to Be Gay: Addressing the Emotional
Maltreatment of Queer Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 168 (1996) ("Queer teens may not only
endure painful harassment from their parents, but are also denied the familial support that is
essential to coping in a society that refuses to accept them.").
49 One study, for example, found that LGBT youth whose parents are aware of their
sexual orientation are significantly more likely to suffer verbal abuse from their parents than
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while some gay and lesbian teenagers are sexually active, for most,
attraction to members of the same sex and homosexual identity far predate
any sexual encounters.50 Finally, LGBT youth have long been ignored by
LGBT adults, in part due to fears of gay adults that they will be accused of
trying to "convert" children to homosexuality.5 l
(a) Presumption of Youth Heterosexuality Renders "Gay Youth" an
Impossibility
Society has been reluctant to recognize that adolescents can be gay.52
Ruskola identified "a central cultural fantasy that gay and lesbian youth do
not exist," which results in "the discursive and material violence that gay
kids confront in their lives. 53 Under this presumption, "an authentically
gay adolescent is simply a contradiction in terms" because "adolescents are
denied the ability to define themselves as gay, and a non-conforming child
is, by definition, not gay but 'confused."' '5 4 While such experimentation
and confusion is a part of many LGBT youths' adolescent experiences,55
those whose parents are unaware of their sexual identity. Anthony R. D'Augelli, Arnold H.
Grossman & Michael T. Starks, Parents' Awareness of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths'
Sexual Orientation, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 474, 479 (2005).
50 See Leslie, supra note 18, at 175-76.
51 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 48, at 168 ("[T]he gay and lesbian community has
tragically failed to address the needs of queer youth, due largely to the community's fear of
the stereotype that it 'recruits' teenagers to homosexuality."); Ruthann Robson, Our
Children: Kids of Queer Parents & Kids Who Are Queer: Looking at Sexual Minority Rights
from a Different Perspective, 64 ALB. L. REv. 915, 947 (2001) ("For many sexual minority
youths, the knowledge that sexual minority adults exist and survive can be life-saving, but
adults who form relationships with young people risk being branded as child molesters.").
Some conservative groups continue to actively perpetuate the myth that the LGBT
community targets children to become homosexual. See, e.g., ALAN SEARS & CRAIG OSTEN,
THE HOMOSEXUAL AGENDA: EXPOSING THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
TODAY 45-47, 50-54 (2003) (describing, in an Alliance Defense Fund pamphlet, the efforts
of "homosexual activists" to "reach young children . . . during the earliest, most
impressionable ages" and to engage in "indoctrination of children . . . as early as
kindergarten.").
52 See Craig Lind, Law, Childhood Innocence and Sexuality, in LEGAL QUEERIES:
LESBIAN, GAY AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 81, 82, 84 (Leslie J. Moran et al. eds.,
1998) (noting that "modern Western tradition dictates that childhood should be a period
when sex and sexuality are irrelevant" and "legal regulation of childhood sexuality.., is,
arguably, the sphere in which the passion for the promotion of heterosexuality is most
striking").
53 Ruskola, supra note 43, at 270.
54 Id. at 280-81; see also Martin, supra note 48, at 174 (discussing how many parents
believe their gay children's homosexual tendencies are a mere phase or "mutable" and
changeable).
55 See Goishi, supra note 46, at 1159-60.
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such presumptions effectively rule out the possibility of being an "LGBT
youth." By ignoring the existence of gay adolescents, society and courts
are less able to ensure those youth equality, respect, freedom from
harassment, and freedom from institutionalized discrimination that many of
them face because of their sexual identity. Put one way, "unless one is a
walking embodiment of the queer stereotype, the presumption of
heterosexuality is all but irrebuttable. 56
(b) Many Adolescents Do Not Come Out or Self-Identify Until Later
Many gay and lesbian teenagers-or those who will ultimately self-
identify as such-tend to get through adolescence without publicly adopting
the label of "gay" or "lesbian., 57  On one hand, the formation and
realization of sexual identity is a long-term process that, for many
individuals, is only just beginning during adolescence. 58 For this group, a
definitive label may make little sense. On the other hand, for the many
adolescents who do recognize their same-sex attractions or transgender
identity, a range of factors may prevent them from self-identifying as
LGBT. These factors include a fear of stigmatization associated with being
gay, a lack of support structures in addressing the social and psychological
challenges involved with coming out, and uncertainty about what degree of
weight to attach to internal emotional attractions and sexual feelings.5 9 All
of these factors lead many LGBT teenagers to resist coming out to either
themselves or others. These internalized struggles, compounded by actual
60or feared intolerance by family members,6 peers, teachers, and others, are
often linked to greater susceptibility to depression, behavioral problems,
and emotional issues. 6 1
56 Ruskola, supra note 43, at 304.
57 See, e.g., Cochran et al., supra note 3, at 773 (discussing a survey of homeless youth
that found most who reported same-sex attractions self-identified as "bisexual"); see Mark S.
Friedman et al., Adolescents Define Sexual Orientation and Suggest Ways to Measure It, 27
J. ADOLESCENCE 303, 304 (2004) ("[F]ar fewer individuals identify as a sexual minority than
claim same-sex attractions, fantasies, and behaviors.").
58 CIANCIOTrO & CAHILL, supra note 2, at 11-12. See generally RITCH C. SAVIN-
WILLIAMs, TIE NEW GAY TEENAGER (2005) (reviewing extensive empirical evidence on
homosexual youths' sexual identity formation).
59 See, e.g., Ritch C. Savin-Williams, The Disclosure to Families of Same-Sex
Attractions by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths, 8 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 49, 51, 59-60
(1998) (discussing gay teenagers' reluctance to come out to their parents).
60 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 13-14; D'Augelli et al., supra note 49, at 480
(illustrating that for both LGBT boys and girls, the main reasons they do not disclose their
sexual orientation to their parents include general fear or hesitancy, fear of rejection or
eviction, and fear of relationship deterioration).61 Goishi, supra note 46, at 1159-60.
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With these factors in mind, it is little surprise that many adolescents do
not outwardly label themselves as homosexual. Although the contours of
the LGBT youth population are impossible to rigidly define for all of these
reasons, the existence of sexual minority youth cannot be denied. For
juveniles who are either openly LGBT or perceived to be so because of
gender non-conforming behavior, discrimination based on their sexual
identity is as real as it is for gay adults-and in many instances, even more
severe and pervasive.
(c) Sexual Identity Precedes Sexual Conduct
Our social and legal traditions have long defined homosexuality by
same-sex sexual acts, rather than as a core, immutable emotional identity.
The fact that LGBT individuals, like their heterosexual counterparts, first
recognize sexual and emotional attractions to others at a young age
62
exposes the flaw in only equating homosexuality with same-sex sexual
conduct. Due in part to the long-standing association between same-sex
sodomy and the identity of being gay or lesbian, a sexual identity apart
from sexual acts may still appear to be a paradox to many.63 Moreover,
because society tends to ignore the reality that teenagers-gay and straight
alike-are having sex,64 it systematically ignores the fact that some
teenagers are sexually active with individuals of the same sex. 65 Finally,
62 A survey of various studies of children's sexual development indicates a consensus
that same-sex sexual attraction begins to form in mid-childhood, and children's subjective
awareness of these attractions begins to take hold at approximately age ten, with boys
growing aware of and acting upon these tendencies slightly earlier than girls. These patterns
mirror those of children who develop opposite-sex attractions. See Gilbert Herdt & Martha
McClintock, The Magical Age of 10, 29 ARcmvEs SEXUAL BEHAY. 587, 597-99 (2000). A
study of gay, lesbian, and bisexual, predominantly racial/ethnic minority youths from inner-
city communities in New York City found that these youths first became aware of their
same-sex attractions at age ten, first considered that they might be gay, lesbian, or bisexual at
ages 12-13, and conclusively decided they were gay, lesbian, or bisexual at ages 14-15
(boys, on average, reached these realizations earlier than girls). See Margaret Rosario et al.,
The Psychosexual Development of Urban Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths, 33 J. SEX RES.
113, 117-18 (1996).
63 As Ruskola commented, "[O]ur culture first reduces gay men and lesbians to sex-
anonymous, meaningless, loveless, demeaning sex-and then proceeds to complain that
homosexuality is only about sex .... [O]nly homosexuals 'practice,' whereas heterosexuals
simply are." Ruskola, supra note 43, at 287-88.
64 Id. at 274-76. Approximately 50 percent of all teenagers are sexually active. James
McGrath, Abstinence-Only Adolescent Education: Ineffective, Unpopular, and
Unconstitutional, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 665, 677 (2004).
65 Several studies of sexual minority youths' sexual development patterns have found
that gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents have their first same-sex sexual experiences, on
average, between ages thirteen and fifteen. See Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Lisa M.
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even when LGBT teenagers' sexual activity is acknowledged, it is often
dismissed as "experimentation" or "a phase" that will pass.66 Underlying
these common sentiments is the false presumption that a conclusive sexual
identity cannot be formed until adulthood.67 As this comment will address
later, the corresponding desire to "protect" children from becoming
homosexual has been cited by courts as a legitimate state interest; 68 faced
with empirical data that contradicts this presumption, reliance on such
stereotypes arguably amounts to just one form of anti-gay prejudice.
(d) Isolation from Mainstream LGBT Community
Not only are LGBT youths' struggles with their sexual identity
development often invisible to their families and communities, one
community uniquely able to provide support mechanisms to struggling
adolescents-LGBT adults-has long kept a distance from minors.69 Since
society has historically conflated homosexuality with sexual perversity,
70
ignorance of gay people's lives fueled widespread, irrational fears that
homosexuals had a propensity to molest children and to actively recruit
juveniles to become gay.71 One commentator described the pervasiveness
of this invalid stereotype: "[T]he mythical specter of 'homosexual
recruitment' accompanies every conversation about gay and lesbian
youth.... The myth grows out of the first axiom of heterosexual logic:
homosexuals must resort to recruitment [since they] cannot have children
and [need] to transmit the homosexual 'culture' ... by converting
heterosexual(s') children ....,'2 Such fallacies have caused many gay
adults to keep their distance from children, lest they be branded sexual
predators.73 More harmful still, courts have cited a desire to "protect"
Diamond, Sexual Identity Trajectories Among Sexual-Minority Youths: Gender
Comparisons, 29 ARcHIvES SExUAL BEHAV. 607, 610 (2000).
66 See Martin, supra note 48, at 174.
67 Id.
68 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
69 Martin, supra note 48, at 167-68.
70 See WmLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 60-61, 298 (2002).
71 Id. At one point, even Justice Rehnquist implied that homosexuality could be treated
like a contagious condition, arguing that a gay student group's challenge to a university
decision to not recognize it was analogous to measles suffers seeking a right not to be
"quarantined." See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1050 n.99 (citing Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434
U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
72 Ruskola, supra note 43, at 275-76.
73 See Robson, supra note 51, at 947-48 ("For many sexual minority youths, the
knowledge that sexual minority adults exist and survive can be life-saving, but adults who
form relationships with young people risk being branded as child molesters.").
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children from homosexuality as a legitimate justification for discriminating
against LGBT people, particularly in the parenting context.74
2. LGBT and Gender Non-Conforming Minors Confront Severe
Discrimination
By choice or from lack of full self-awareness, many LGBT adolescents
are not open about their sexuality and "pass" as the societal default:
heterosexual. By virtue of their heteronormative behavior, they are less
likely to confront the discrimination faced by their openly LGBT and
gender non-conforming peers.75 The rules change for those teenagers who
come out voluntarily, who are "outed" as gay, or who exhibit gender non-
74 There are numerous examples of courts finding that shielding children from adults'
homosexuality is a legitimate interest. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
650-51 (2000) (upholding the Boy Scouts' right to exclude openly gay scout leaders because
of the Organization's position that "scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters inculcate
[scouts] with the Boy Scouts' values-both expressly and by example" and accepting the
group's position that such exclusions were rationally related to the interest of "not want[ing]
to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior"); Marlow v. Marlow, 702
N.E.2d 733, 737-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a trial court's restrictions on a gay
father's child visitation rights and finding it in the children's best interest to be shielded from
their father's homosexuality); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(also upholding restrictions on a gay father's visitation rights because "exposing the child to
the presence of persons who aggressively promote the practice of homosexuality" could
result in harm to the child); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 691-94 (Va. 1985) (holding that an
"award of custody to a parent who carries on an active homosexual relationship in the same
residence as the child... is not in the child's best interests and that an award of custody to
such a parent constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion," and noting that "the conduct
inherent in the father's relationship is punishable as a class six felony" and that "the
conditions under which this child must live daily are not only unlawful but also impose an
intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social condemnation attached to them, which
will inevitably afflict her relationships with her peers and with the community at large")
(emphasis added).
75 All children, however, are affected by homophobic epithets and visible anti-gay
sentiments in their homes and schools, regardless of their sexual orientation. See generally
JEAN M. BAKER, How HOMOPHOBLA HuRTs CHILDREN 4-7 (2002). Homophobia produces
feelings of inferiority which become internalized by children and youth who come to
recognize same-sex attractions. Id. at 6-7. The perceived stigma of "being gay" may make
that child more reluctant to accept his or her own same-sex attractions or to come out
publicly, which may carry its own set of harms. For discussions of LGBT individuals'
internalized homophobia, see, for example, Friedland, supra note 10, at 784 ("After years of
being exposed to school-yard name calling and disparaging remarks that often occur about
LGBT people around the dinner table, for example, LGBT youth are aware of the risks
involved with sharing their sexual identity-with 'coming out' and daring to be honest about
what they feel."); Leslie, supra note 18, at 116-17; Amy D. Ronner, Homophobia: In the
Closet and in the Coffin, 21 LAW & INEQ. 65, 69 (2003) ("[B]eing in the closet can be an
internalization of societal homophobia or an acceptance of one's sexual identity as
something shameful ... ").
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conforming behavior that, regardless of their actual sexuality, leads others
to perceive them as gay. 76  These teens are more likely to have family
problems," be harassed at school,78 and enter foster care or the child
welfare system.79 Suicide attempt and success rates are disproportionately
higher among LGBT kids.80  Flowing from these problems, LGBT youth
are disproportionately likely to experience periods of homelessness and,
while homeless, to engage in delinquent activities that lead them to the
juvenile justice system. 81 Those LGBT minors that enter public custody in
group homes or juvenile detention centers continue to face discrimination,
physical and sexual abuse, verbal harassment, and social isolation because
of their real or perceived sexual orientation. 2
(a) Problems at Home
LGBT youth often first confront discrimination in their homes. Half
of all LGBT youth experience some form of parental rejection because of
their sexual orientation. 83  Verbal abuse by parents is common.1
4
76 Powerful anecdotal evidence of the discrimination faced by LGBT young people has
been documented in numerous books, journal articles, websites, and other media. See, e.g.,
Paul Schindler, Homelessness and Hope: Building Safe Housing Alternates for Queer Youth,
GAY CITY NEWS, Dec. 4-10, 2003, available at http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn 249/
homelessnessandhope.html (profiling three homeless LGBT youth in New York City and
describing social service agencies serving this population). See generally GERALD P.
MALLON, WE DON'T EXACTLY GET THE WELCOME WAGON (1998) (chronicling the anecdotal
experiences of fifty-four LGBT youth in the child welfare system); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra
note 47; Daphne Scholinski, After-Wards, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1997) (providing a first-
person account by a lesbian artist and writer about being institutionalized because of her
gender non-conforming behavior).
77 See generally FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 13-14; Martin, supra note 48, at 170-
75; Robson, supra note 51, at 933-36. Parental abuse rates, for example, are significantly
higher for openly gay teenagers than for their closeted counterparts. Martin, supra note 48,
at 169-70.
78 See generally MICHAEL BOCHENEK & A. WIDNEY BROWN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS: VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN U.S. SCHOOLS (2001); CIANCIOTTO & CAHILL,
supra note 2, at 29-40.
79 See FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 15-16.
80 Ruskola, supra note 43, at 271 ("Gay and lesbian teenagers are two to three times
more likely to attempt suicide, and to accomplish it, than their heterosexual peers."). Some
estimates conclude that just under one-third of all youth suicides are committed by LGBT
youth. See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 57.
81 FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 11, 17-20.
82 See generally id; Friedland, supra note 10; Sullivan, supra note 6.
83 Martin, supra note 48, at 169 (citing two empirical studies).
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Approximately one-third of LGBT youth were victims of physical violence
by a family member after they came out or their sexual orientation was
revealed. Additionally, many LGBT teens are kicked out of their homes
because of parental conflicts about their sexual identity.86  Abuse rates
against LGBT youth are highest for those that are also racial minorities.
87
Many LGBT minors in the child welfare system are victims of parental
neglect or abuse.88 Additionally, parental abuse is frequently linked to the
high LGBT youth runaway rate.89
(b) Experiences at School
Abuse against LGBT youth is not confined to the home. Over two-
thirds of all LGBT youth have been verbally or physically harassed on the
basis of their sexual orientation; 90 additionally, nearly 90 percent have
"sometimes or frequently hear[d] homophobic remarks" in school.91
Marking improving societal attitudes toward gays and lesbians, including in
the school context, many adolescents are now voluntarily coming out
during high school.92  Significant numbers of high school students self-
identify as gay.93 Nearly half of high schools students know a gay
classmate, and two-thirds of today's high school students know someone
who is gay.94 Increasing numbers of LGBT teenagers are publicly open
84 D'Augelli et al., supra note 49, at 481 ("Parents who suspect their children to be LGB
may make more antigay comments, which may lead to learning that they have an LGB child.
Gender atypical children may provoke more negative parental comments.").
85 NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LGBTQ YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1,
http://nclrights.org/publications/pubs/lgbtqjuvenilejustice.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
86 Id.
87 Martin, supra note 48, at 170.
88 Sullivan, supra note 6, at 45 (discussing parental violence against LGBT children and
citing statistics provided by a California social service agency that three-fourths of gay and
lesbian children in child welfare were abused or neglected by their parents).
89 Martin, supra note 48, at 176 ("Many abused queer youth escape abuse by running
away from home. Another portion of them are kicked out of home because of their sexual
orientation.").
90 HETRICK-MARTIN INST., LGBTQ YOUTH STATISTICS (2005), http://www.hmi.org/
(scroll to bottom of homepage; then follow "LGBTQ Youth Statistics" hyperlink under
"F.A.Q's" heading).
91 Id.
92 A national poll of students in grades 9-12 conducted in April 2004 found that 5% of
high school students self-identified as gay (6% of boys and 4% of girls). GAY, LESBIAN, &
STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, DETAILED TABLES: HIGH SCHOOL ATTITUDES ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION 2 (2004), http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSENATTACHMENTS/file/
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about their sexual orientation. 95 Nevertheless, they continue to face similar
obstacles and challenges as those faced by their predecessors in years past:
children "are often victims of the high visibility of, and widely divergent
attitudes toward, gay issues. Greater visibility brings both broader
acceptance of homosexuality and an increased risk of discrimination:
While there are indications that greater societal tolerance and visibility of gay issues
has resulted in children "coming out" at an earlier age, these children may be
subjected to open hostility; hatred in arenas which ought to provide a safe and secure
environment; and intolerance, often within their homes, schools, and communities.
97
Gay teens' increasing outness makes it more difficult for their parents,
classmates, teachers, and others to deny the existence or legitimacy of their
sexual identity; as long as homophobia exists, however, many LGBT teens
will also continue to confront discrimination in their daily lives.
3. At-Risk LGBT Youths' Path to Homelessness
In addition to comprising up to half of the homeless population in
major cities,98 LGBT youth are believed to be grossly overrepresented in
state child welfare and juvenile justice systems.99 Under a typical path,
family problems associated with LGBT adolescents' sexual identity lead
them to be kicked out of or run away from home.' 00 If they enter the child
welfare system, they often continue to be harassed and abused-by foster
parents, group home workers, and other youth.1 1 When these other options
are exhausted, homelessness may appear to be the only option.10 2 Running
away from home, foster care, or group homes is the most frequent path to
95 See, e.g., John Cloud, The Battle Over Gay Teens, TIME, Oct. 10, 2005, at 44
(reporting recent studies that "[k]ids are disclosing their homosexuality with unprecedented
regularity-and they are doing so much younger"); John Caldwell, Ahead of Their Class,
ADvOCATE, June 22, 2004, at 90.
96 Goishi, supra note 46, at 1149. See generally, Franke, supra note 14, (describing the
public's response to Lawrence and the evolution of public opinion on LGBT people and
issues).
97 See, e.g., Goishi, supra note 46, at 1149.
98 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
99 See FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. LGBT youth are estimated by some to make
up between four and ten percent of youth in the juvenile justice system. Id. Since even
liberal estimates of the adult LGBT population fall in that same general range, see supra note
5, self-identified LGBT youth, whose percentage of their age group population is smaller
since many teens are still in early stages of coming out, see discussion supra Part II.A.1, are
therefore necessarily overrepresented in the juvenile justice population.





homelessness for these disenfranchised youths. 10 3 Delinquent and criminal
behavior associated with homelessness leads them into the juvenile justice
system, where they again experience discrimination, lack of awareness of
their special needs, and harassment by police, lawyers, judges, and the staff
and fellow juveniles in detention centers. 104
Where does this vicious cycle begin? Generally speaking, "minors
come into the care of the state either by committing a crime or due to some
breakdown in the parent-child relationship."' 0'5  LGBT youth are
disproportionately more likely to experience the latter and profound
troubles at home, and thus end up under the state's care in the child welfare
system. 10 6 Parental abuse of gay children-in many instances, inspired or
worsened by the child's real or perceived sexuality' 07-can also provide
state officials incentive to place these children in the child welfare system
for their own protection.10 8 Behavioral problems associated with sexuality
issues, like acting out, defiant behavior, sexual promiscuity, and school
performance issues, are also linked to troubles at home for both LGBT and
other disenfranchised youth. 109 For some racial and ethnic minority LGBT
youth, the problems of familial and community acceptance may be
markedly worse. 10
Unfortunately, however, the problems of harassment and abuse
commonly continue for LGBT children placed in foster care or group
103 For a discussion of the foster care runaway problem, see Kevin M. Ryan, Stemming
the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: A Due Process Perspective, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 271
(1993). Ryan noted that up to half of homeless youth were previously in foster care. Id. at
275-76.
104 See id. (documenting the experiences of LGBT youth in the New York juvenile
justice system, with findings and recommendations drawn with both New York-specific and
national implications); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 47; Friedland, supra note 10, at 777;
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 31.
105 Sullivan, supra note 6, at 35-36; see also Robson, supra note 51, at 933-94 ("The
overwhelming majority of youths who leave their homes do not go because they are ready to
have adult lives of independence and adventure; they are evicted or constructively evicted by
their parents or guardians because of the adults' intolerance.").
106 Sullivan, supra note 6, at 41.
107 Id.
108 Id.; see also Goishi, supra note 46.
109 See Laurie Schaffner, Female Juvenile Delinquency Sexual Solutions, Gender Bias,
and Juvenile Justice, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3-4 (1998). The behavioral problems that
Schaffner attributes to girls in the juvenile justice system are shared by many LGBT youth
who experience family problems. See also Goishi, supra note 46, at 1159-60 (attributing
"acting out" behavior to emotional difficulties, depression, and feelings of lack of acceptance
associated with the coming out process).
110 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 14.
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homes.' In group home settings, LGBT youth are frequently victimized
by both peers and staff, experiencing verbal harassment, physical violence,
and sexual assault." 12 In many instances, even well-meaning staff simply do
not know what to do with sexual minority youth under their supervision.
13
While some cities have LGBT-only group homes, such facilities are rare
and unlikely to have the capacity to meet actual need.'
14
Statistics bear out that homeless LGBT youth are compelled to commit
certain "survival crimes" such as prostitution and theft in order to maintain
their existence.115 "Approximately two-thirds of adolescent male prostitutes
are gay," and homeless LGBT youth "are often forced into prostitution
116because of a lack of other alternatives" for financial or emotional support.
Child prostitution is more frequently punished as a crime rather than as a
symptom of victimization or survival." 7  Since the incarceration of
juveniles is often more punitive than rehabilitative, 18 the underlying
problems faced by youths who engage in prostitution are left unresolved.
4. LGBT Youth Encounter Widespread Discrimination in the Juvenile
Justice System
Those at-risk sexual minority youth who enter the juvenile justice
system are more likely than their heterosexual counterparts to encounter
discrimination and mistreatment on the basis of their sexual orientation
once they are in the system." 9 From the point of arrest, in juvenile court
proceedings, and in detention centers, LGBT youth are disadvantaged by
explicit discrimination and widespread ignorance of their special needs.
120
i1 Id.; see also Friedland, supra note 10.
112 See Friedland, supra note 10, at 802-04.
113 Id.; Casciano et al., supra note 2, at 226-27.
114 Friedland, supra note 10, at 803-04.
115 See FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 18-20; see also Libby Adler, New Perspectives
on Labor and Gender: An Essay on the Production of Youth Prostitution, 55 ME. L. REV.
191, 192-94 (2003); Arriola, supra note 11, at 452-53; Friedland, supra note 10, at 794-95;
Alecia Humphrey, The Criminalization of Survival Attempts: Locking Up Female Runaways
and Other Status Offenders, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 175-78 (2004) (on runaway
girls); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 41 (describing frequent arrests of homeless youth for theft of
food and clothing items, as well as trespassing in abandoned buildings).
116 Martin, supra note 48, at 177.
117 See Humphrey, supra note 115, at 178; Pantea Javidan, Comment, Defining
Feminism: Invisible Targets: Juvenile Prostitution, Crackdown Legislation, and the Example
of California, 9 CARDozo WOMEN'S L.J. 237, 239-40 (2003).
118 See generally Stacey Gurian-Sherman, Back to the Future: Returning Treatment to
Juvenile Justice, 15 CRIM. JUST. 30 (2000).




LGBT youth are a double legal minority; childhood and sexual orientation
independently impact individuals' legal rights, 121 and together they create
unique questions in courts of law. 122 As one commentator observed, "j]ust
as society and its laws regard sexual minorities with ambivalence, society
and its laws also regard children with mixed feelings. '2 3 Coupled with
lawyers' and judges' lack of awareness of the special needs of LGBT
children, 124 courts can be unfriendly places for LGBT youth offenders who
enter the juvenile justice system. Specific forms of discrimination
frequently faced by gay and transgender youth in juvenile justice facilities
are described below.
(a) At-Risk LGBT Youth, Already Harmed By the System, Encounter
Problems in Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Detention Centers
As they do in their homes, schools, and communities, LGBT youth
face pervasive "invisibility" in courts. It is impossible to truly assess
judicial treatment of sexual minority youth, because only a handful of
decisions explicitly mention or attempt to deal with the sexual orientation of
LGBT youth. 125 The reasons for this are two-fold. First, by nature, family
and juvenile court are often closed proceedings with unpublished decisions,
limiting the ability of outsiders to assess courts' treatment of LGBT minors.
Second, many judges are unaware that specific children before them are
LGBT,126 or, in fact, that any children that appear in their courtrooms are
sexual minorities. 127 This ignorance is often shared by the lawyers who
121 See generally David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children's Relationship
Rights, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1117 (2003) (discussing children's constitutional rights
and the "shadowy ground" they occupy in privacy law); Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to
Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 313 (2003).
122 See Goishi, supra note 46, at 1150.
123 id.
124 See FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 35-39, 40-41 (special needs of LGBT youth in
these facilities include mental health services and counseling related to their sexual
orientation and gender identity, support in coming out, placement in facilities consistent with
their gender expression, and staff appropriately trained to protect them from harassment and
assault because of their sexual orientation).
125 Martin, supra note 48, at 179.
126 FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 26-27. Gender non-conforming youths may be
misidentified as LGBT, and receive discriminatory treatment on that basis, while youth who
can "pass" as straight are presumed to be heterosexual. Id.
127 Id. A Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund report printed a remarkable
example of public officials' lack of awareness of the existence of LGBT youth, quoting a
child welfare official as asserting "her state had no need for policies, training, and programs
to protect LGBT youth because there simply were none in the state's foster care system."
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 11-12. Beth Barrett argues that this invisibility in the
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represent juvenile sexual minorities. 128 If attorneys and judges are aware of
a juvenile's sexual orientation, they often have no idea what to make of that
fact, and largely ignore a child's sexuality in advocating for or making legal
decisions about these youth.
12 9
In the juvenile detention system itself, LGBT youth experience
significant levels of discrimination and harassment from both officials and
other detained youth. Although juvenile detention center conditions for all
youth offenders are notoriously inadequate, 30 LGBT youth face additional
challenges that their non-LGBT counterparts do not. LGBT youth
offenders' experiences in the juvenile justice system and detention centers
mirror those that adult gay criminals have long had in the criminal justice
system and in prison. 31 Anti-gay verbal harassment by other detainees is
commonplace and physical assault is also a common problem.
132
Homophobic epithets are infrequently punished. 133 LGBT youth also face
social isolation, especially since LGBT youth also lack family support
structures. 134 Poorly trained staff compound all these problems.' 3 5 Sexual
assault by staff and nonconsensual sex with other juveniles is also a
problem in many juvenile facilities across the country. 36
courtroom, and ignorance of the underlying homophobia relevant to LGBT parties' cases,
extends to LGBT adults as well. Beth Barrett, Defining Queer: Lesbian and Gay Visibility
in the Courtroom, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 143, 149 (2000). Barrett advocates for
increased awareness-raising of judges and juries of LGBT-specific issues. Id. at 160.
128 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 11-12.
129 FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 28-32 (discussing few juvenile sentencing options
that can take sexual orientation into account).
130 See generally Gurian-Sherman, supra note 118. The most common problems in
juvenile facilities include a lack of treatment and rehabilitative services; unhealthy,
overcrowded, and dangerous living conditions; inadequate supervision and harassment by
staff; and pervasive violence and sexual assault. Id. at 31-32.
131 See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 18, at 129 (discussing that among prisoners who are
openly gay, outed as gay, or perceived to be gay, physical, verbal, and sexual abuse by other
inmates, police, and prison officials is commonplace).
132 See FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 32-35. It bears noting that many non-LGBT
youth in juvenile detention centers have been placed there because they have committed
offenses against LGBT people. Schaffner, supra note 3, at 61.
133 FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 39.
134 Id. at 34-35.
135 Id. at 36-39.
136 A recent Department of Justice study found that staff sexual misconduct and
nonconsensual sex occurs more frequently in state-operated juvenile facilities than in state or
federal prisons. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE
REPORTED BY CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2004 (2005).
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(b) Judicial Discrimination Against LGBT Youth Is Often Justified as a
"Protective" Mechanism
Some scholars speculate that courts' inability to appropriately deal
with the unique situations faced by LGBT youth offenders is rooted in
homophobia and misunderstanding of youth sexuality. 137  In juvenile
proceedings, even judges who seek to act in LGBT youths' best interests
are often constrained by systemic limitations that can further harm these
youth. 138 These include sentencing LGBT offenders to "protective custody"
where they are segregated from other youth or in more restrictive settings,
like secure facilities, normally reserved for juveniles who commit severe
crimes. 139 Both sentencing options socially isolate LGBT youth and imply
that they are being punished more gravely because of their sexual
orientation, rather than addressing underlying problems in the general
detention facilities. 140  In most instances, attorneys and jadges are not
trained to identify or deal with LGBT-specific issues.1
41
In pre-Lawrence decisions involving sexual orientation, LGBT youth,
and family law, a dominant legal theme was that youth can (and should) be
protected from homosexuality, lest they fall "victim" to it.142 This doctrine
has perpetuated a long-standing and unfounded societal fear that gay people
seek to "convert" children to homosexuality. According to William
Eskridge, for example, "[m]any traditionalists also consider homosexuality
contagious in some way. Unless the polity takes a strong moral (and
criminal) stance against bad conduct, it will spread to vulnerable
Americans, especially young people.' 43 This unsubstantiated fear has been
used by courts to continue to justify discriminatory policies against both
LGBT youth and LGBT adults who interact with children.
144
B. PRE-LA WRENCE LEGAL DOCTRINE, AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
RIGHTS OF LGBT YOUTH
Prior to Lawrence, one of the most troubling aspects of anti-gay
sodomy laws was that they conflated homosexual sex acts with homosexual
137 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 48, at 184-86.
138 See FEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 28-32.
139 Id.
140 id.
141 Id. at 35.
142 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 70, at 3-4, 298.
143 Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1049-50.
144 See supra note 73.
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sexual identity, linking the act to status. 145 The flaw in this logic is exposed
when one considers the experiences of LGBT youth, whose sexual identity
usually precedes-and is often completely independent of-any actual
sexual conduct. 46 The full range of emotions, attractions, feelings, and
common experiences of "growing up different" and confronting the world
as a minority shapes the full experience of what it means to be a gay person.
Those feelings can start years, even decades, before one first has sex; for
most gay people, it is demeaning to think that their identity as a sexual
minority is reduced only to certain sexual acts. Although sodomy laws
helped, in part, to shape the class of "homosexuals" by the sexual acts in
which they were likely to engage, it became less obvious over time that gay
people could be defined solely in terms of sex acts. 14 7 As LGBT people
became increasingly visible and formed a cognizable community in the
latter half of the twentieth century, the depth and texture of gay peoples'
lives evolved away from tired, caricatured stereotypes. 148
This conflation of status and act, however, was problematic,
particularly in creating a "criminal class" based on assumed sexual
behavior. 49 Until Lawrence was decided, a "persistent myth" existed that
because sodomy laws were largely unenforced, they created no injury to
gays and lesbians. 50 Sodomy laws, Leslie argued, did "not merely define
the fluid boundaries of a social class; rather, they achieve[d] indirectly what
the states cannot do directly: criminalize homosexuals."', 51
The criminal class was overbroad, sweeping many who did not fit this
assumption, including youth, into the realm of presumptive criminality. 152
As Leslie describes,
145 See Leslie, supra note 18, at 110-12 (arguing that while sodomy laws proscribed
same-sex sexual conduct, they had the effect of oppressing LGBT people on the basis of
sexual identity). For an example of how this conflation of sexual conduct with homosexual
identity has impacted individual LGBT people, see Barrett, supra note 114, at 173-74 ("the
homophobic myth that gays and lesbians are nothing more than sexual beings").
146 See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
147 Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1055.
148 Id. As Eskridge observed, sodomy laws "were originally not at odds with the anti-
caste principle because they were not associated with any class of people. It was not until
well into the twentieth century that sodomy became a metonym for a new category of
person, the 'homosexual'...." Id.; see also Leslie, supra note 18, at 168 ("Although men
and women have practiced homosexual conduct for millennia, homosexuality as a status is of
relatively recent vintage.").
149 Leslie, supra note 18, at 175-76.
150 Id. at 108.
151 Idat I10.
152 Id. at 175-76.
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Because identity and conduct are conflated, the contours of the criminal class are also
overinclusive in several ways.... Desire precedes action. In the same way that
heterosexual teenage boys are heterosexual even before they lose their virginity, gay
youth are, by the same standard, gay even if they have never acted upon their same-
sex attraction. In short, sexual identity is broader than sexual conduct .... 153
Regardless, whether sexually active or not, all gays and lesbians bore
the stigma associated with the presumption that homosexuals engaged in
criminal conduct, and that stigma resulted in discrimination, including
against LGBT youth.
Over the past two decades, evolving legal doctrine on the rights of
LGBT individuals has shaped the legal status of sexual minority youth, and
informed the understanding of Lawrence, the Supreme Court's most recent
gay rights decision. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, the status
of LGBT people before the law evolved from a criminal class defined only
by sodomy and sexual deviancy 154 to a class of people with rights worth
protecting. 155 This evolution has been uneven and based on ambiguous
Supreme Court doctrine; nevertheless, by the time Lawrence was decided in
2003, it was apparent that the Court had been moved by the nascent societal
and legal acceptance of LGBT people.1
56
1. Romer v. Evans Eliminated Animus Against Gays as a Rational State
Interest
In its 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans,157 the Supreme Court struck
down the State of Colorado's Amendment 2,158 a state constitutional
amendment which prohibited local municipalities from passing non-
discrimination laws that included sexual orientation. 59 The Romer Court
invalidated the Colorado amendment under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that "[a] State cannot so deem a class
of persons a stranger to its laws" by passing laws against homosexuals "not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
153 Id.
154 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986) (calling the claim that the right to
engage in private, consensual homosexual sex is fundamental "at best, facetious").
155 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional
amendment denying equal protections to LGBT citizens); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446
(7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a high school student's equal protection discrimination claim of
discriminatory treatment by school administrators based on sexual orientation after school
district failed to protect plaintiff from harassment and assault).
156 See Hutchinson, supra note 39, at 18.
157 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
158 Id. at 635-46.
159 Id. at 623-24.
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else.' 160  Finding the amendment "inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects, 161 gays and lesbians, Justice Kennedy wrote for
the majority that even under rational basis review, the classification created
by the amendment bore no reasonable relation to a legitimate state
interest.162
Romer was significant for two key reasons. First, it found that hatred
or moral disapproval of homosexuality is not a rational basis for
discrimination against gays and lesbians as a class.163 Second, and more
importantly, for the first time in the Supreme Court's history, the Court in
Romer found that homosexual people do, indeed, form a "class" that can
and does face invidious discrimination.164 Implicit in this holding was that
being gay was something more than being a sodomite. In contrast to its
earlier holding in Bowers, the status of homosexuality did transcend the
mere sexual act associated with it.
165
2. Courts Expressed New Willingness to Protect LGBT Youth from Harm
The equal protection themes articulated in Romer have also appeared
in lower court decisions involving LGBT youth. The Seventh Circuit
decided Nabozny v. Podlesny,166 in which the plaintiff was a gay high
school student, shortly after Romer.'67 Jamie Nabozny, the gay student,
sued his Wisconsin school district after enduring years of verbal harassment
and severe physical violence by other students because of his sexual
orientation. 168  School district officials failed to respond to this ongoing
abuse, even after becoming aware of it.169  At one point, the school
principal told Nabozny and his parents "that 'boys will be boys' and... if
16 Id. at 635-36.




165 Justice Scalia's dissent reacts to the majority's notion that sexual orientation is
broader than the underlying sexual acts involved, maintaining the synonymity of
"orientation" and "conduct": "If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational
to deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage
in the conduct. Indeed, where criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual 'orientation'
is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct." Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
167 Romer was decided after oral arguments in Nabozny. The Seventh Circuit noted that
"[a]lthough Romer bolsters our analysis in this case to some extent, we do not rely on it,"
predicting further that "[olf course Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal
protection by... Romer." Id. at 458 n.12.
168 Id. at 449.
169 Id. at 451-52.
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he was 'going to be so openly gay,' he should 'expect' such behavior from
his fellow students."' 70
The Seventh Circuit found that Nabozny stated a valid Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim because school district officials denied
him the protections afforded other harassed students on the basis of his
sexual orientation. 171 The court found that there was "little doubt that
homosexuals are an identifiable minority subjected to discrimination in our
society.' '172  It held that the district's intentional inaction amounted to
invidious discrimination against Nabozny because of his sexual
orientation. 173  While the court stopped short of deciding whether
"homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class,"' 74 it nevertheless held
that even under minimal rational basis review, discrimination against a high
school student on the basis of sexual orientation had no valid
justification. 175
Nabozny is important for two reasons. First, it not only articulated the
notion that LGBT people form an identifiable class who may invoke equal
protection review, it also included LGBT youth in this class. In so doing, it
recognized that minors can be sexual minorities, and that they do face state-
enforced discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation. Second, it
reinforced the Romer doctrine that animus or prejudice against LGBT
people cannot serve as a rational basis for discriminatory practices or
policies disfavoring them. It also spurred action by school districts to
prevent similar lawsuits and a series of similar lawsuits by gay students in
other states. 1
76
170 Id. at 451.
171 Id. at 454.
172 Id. at 457.
17' Id. at 458.
174 Id.
175 id.
176 See David S. Buckel, Legal Perspective on Ensuring a Safe and Nondiscriminatory
School Environment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Students, 32 EDUC. &
URBAN SocrETY 390, 392 (2000) (describing the promising legacy of Nabozny several years
after the decision). Such suits continue in 2005. An administrative law judge in New Jersey
found chronic anti-gay harassment against a public school student violated the state's non-
discrimination law. L.W. v. Toms River Reg'l Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. CRT 8535-01 (N.J.
Dep't of Law & Public Safety, July 26, 2004) (admin. action, findings, determinations and
order), available at http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcr/downloads/orders/LW-v-Toms-River.pdf.
The case has been appealed to the New Jersey appeals court.
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III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas177 further
strengthened the doctrine first articulated in Romer that gays and lesbians,
as a distinct class of people, can find relief in the Constitution from
discriminatory public policies that are grounded solely in homophobia and
animus. 178  In Romer, the Court took the important step of finally
recognizing gays and lesbians as an identifiable group, moving beyond the
former view that sexual orientation was defined solely by sexual conduct,
and in so doing articulated the principle that mere moral disapproval of
gays would no longer be a legitimate justification for discrimination against
them. Lawrence went one step further, finding that gays' and lesbians'
ability to individually define their core human identity-including their
sexual orientation-is a liberty interest protected from state interference.
It is this holding in Lawrence-that courts must take a closer look at
policies which treat gays differently before holding them "rational"-that
offers the most promise to LGBT youth who face discrimination on the
basis of their sexual orientation. Despite the broad and irrefutable equality
principles articulated in Lawrence, some courts have attempted to narrow
the scope of Lawrence by picking up on ambiguous language-including
the "minor exception" language in the caveat paragraph-to exclude LGBT
youth from constitutional protections from discrimination. After discussing
the promise of Lawrence, this section will analyze two such decisions,
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services in
the Eleventh Circuit and the Kansas state appellate court's ruling in State v.
Limon, and conclude that those courts misread Lawrence and misapplied
the minor exception, which arguably has nothing to do with LGBT youth at
all. Finally, this section will conclude that the "rational basis with bite"
standard of review that emerged in Romer and was bolstered by Lawrence
can be used by LGBT youth challenging discriminatory confinement
conditions in juvenile justice facilities under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. WHAT LA WRENCE V. TEXAS MEANS FOR LGBT YOUTH
Lawrence overturned the 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick179 that
found anti-gay sodomy statutes constitutionally permissible. 80 Although
many expected a departure from Bowers, the forcefulness with which the
Court reversed its own precedent was stunning since Bowers had been
177 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
178 See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.




decided less than two decades earlier. 181  More significantly, Lawrence
confirmed the notion first suggested in Romer that gays' and lesbians'
sexual orientation forms a core part of their identity. Unfortunately,
Lawrence contains ambiguous language that may limit its ultimate scope,
including the caveat paragraph at the conclusion of the majority decision,182
in which it seemingly excluded certain groups-including minors-from its
holding. 183 What this caveat paragraph ultimately means for LGBT youth is
an open question, as the Court itself has not yet clarified its positions in
Lawrence in any subsequent decisions. Nevertheless, it is an incorrect
reading of the caveat paragraph to deny LGBT youth protections from
invidious discrimination that LGBT adults now enjoy in light of Lawrence.
1. In Reversing Bowers, the Court Rejected That Decision's
Discriminatory Core Premises
Lawrence, by holding anti-sodomy statutes unconstitutional and
affirming the right of all adults to engage in consensual sexual acts in the
privacy of their homes, decriminalized gay and lesbian sexual identity. In
so doing, it wholeheartedly rejected its previous decision in Bowers,'84 and
recognized that gays and lesbians, as a class, have liberty interests protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 85
Bowers stood for four basic premises. First, it held that homosexuals
are not a class, and implied that gay sexual orientation is nothing more than
homosexual conduct.186 Second, it held that discriminatory policies against
individuals who engage in that conduct are permissible. 187 Third, it stood
181 Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1022. In the eighteen page majority opinion in Lawrence,
Justice Kennedy devoted thirteen full pages to deconstructing Bowers and categorically
rejecting the flawed historical and constitutional bases of that decision. See 539 U.S. at 566-
78.
182 Id. at 578; see discussion infra Part III.A.3.
183 Id. (also excluding persons likely to be coerced or unable to give consent, prostitution,
and public sex).
184 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
185 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. Tribe argues that "[tihe 'liberty' of which the Court
spoke was as much about equal dignity and respect as it was about freedom of action-more
so, in fact." Tribe, supra note 19, at 1898.
186 The Bowers majority addressed only homosexual sodomy and referred to Hardwick
as a "practicing homosexual," suggesting that one is only gay if one engages in gay sex acts.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986). The Court ignored any equal protection
concerns in this focus on act rather than status. See also ANDREw KOPPELMAN, THE GAY
RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMEICAN LAW 51-52 (2002) (describing the Court's
misplaced focus on homosexual sodomy and failure to address "unsettled" Equal Protection
questions of anti-gay discrimination as the "central defect of the [Bowers] opinion").
187 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-93.
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for the notion that advancing the morality of the majority is a rational basis
for discrimination. 188  Finally, it tagged all gays and lesbians with a
presumption of criminality based on the proscriptions against the sexual
conduct associated with them, a presumption that stigmatized LGBT people
and permitted wide-ranging discrimination against LGBT people. 189
Lawrence, in overturning Bowers, explicitly or implicitly rejected each
of these premises. First, it recognized that gay people are a class with
constitutional interests.' 90 Second, it found that invidious discrimination
aimed at oppressing gays' and lesbians' basic human liberties is not
permissible.' 9 ' Third, it held that morality cannot trump these basic liberty
interests. 192 Finally, by lifting the presumption of criminality, it eliminated
a significant basis of state-enforced discrimination against LGBT people
that was approved in Bowers. 193 Since Bowers itself formed a significant
part of that long history of legal discrimination, the Court's reversal of the
decision represented its own contribution to repudiating discrimination the
Court itself had sanctioned.
2. Lawrence Is Undergirded by Broad Equality Themes for Gays and
Lesbians
In the majority opinion in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy generously used
language reflecting a refined and sensitive recognition of gay people's
sexual and human identity. 194  Remarkably, in addition to its legal
... Id. at 196.
189 See discussion supra notes 17-21.
190 The Lawrence Court held, "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice." 539 U.S. at 567-68. In the first sentence, the Court distinguishes
sexuality from sexual conduct, suggesting its subsequent reference to "homosexual persons"
who can make the "choice" to engage in such conduct are a class no longer defined by their
sexual acts. Id.
191 Id. at 578-79.
192 Id. at 571.
193 The Court explicitly acknowledged that anti-gay sodomy laws functioned as "an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres" and rejected Bowers in part because "[i]ts continuance as precedent
demeans the lives of homosexual persons." Id. at 575.
194 Id. at 576-77. The Court had previously acknowledged this shift in Boy Scouts v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). In the majority opinion in that case by Justice Rehnquist, the
Court noted that "Justice Stevens' dissent makes much of its observation that the public
perception of homosexuality in this country has changed. Indeed, it appears that
homosexuality has gained greater societal acceptance." Id. at 660. In Lawrence, the Court
acknowledged that the "foundations of Bowers have sustained serious erosion from our
recent decisions in Casey and Romer." 539 U.S. at 576.
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significance, Lawrence ushered in a period of hopeful optimism by the
LGBT community that the decision marked a cultural shift toward
increased societal acceptance of sexual minorities' rights.195 Before George
W. Bush's 2004 reelection victory was partially credited to a triumph of
"traditional values" among the American electorate, 196 in the year following
Lawrence something remarkable happened: stimulated by Lawrence, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in that state
197
and the mayor of San Francisco and other communities acted temporarily to
grant marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples in their jurisdictions. 198
In a matter of months, the gay rights movement had shifted from seeking to
strike down prohibitions on consensual same-sex sexual activity to using
the newfound decriminalized status to seek full equality before the law.
So, although the Lawrence decision was based on the Due Process
Clause and not on equal protection grounds, 199 the net effect was to
195 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 39, at 39.
196 After the 2004 elections, the media credited Bush's victory in Ohio and elsewhere to
a strong turn-out of Christian voters motivated by "moral" issues including abortion and
same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Paul Nussbaum & Marcia Gelbart, The Values Vote: For
Some, It Became a Matter of Faith, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 4, 2004, at Al; Kate
Zernike & John M. Broder, The 2004 Elections: The Electorate-The Mood of the
Electorate; War? Jobs? No, Character Counted Most to Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004,
at 1. In the aftermath of the elections, even some gay rights advocates blamed themselves
for Democrats' losses at the polls. See, e.g, Mickey Wheatley, Gay Marriage: Unions Less
Perfect, But... After the Repudiation of Election Day, It's Time for Homosexuals to Get
What They Need, Not What They Want, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 2004, at A5 1. But others have
argued that the media misreported exit poll data that found "moral values" was the most
important issue to 2004 voters. See, e.g., Kenneth Sherrill, Did Same-Sex Marriage Doom
Kerry?, GAY & LESBIAN Rv., Jan. 1., 2005, at 14 (arguing that "the notion that the issue of
same-sex marriage cost the election to the Democratic Party has been uncritically accepted
as the common wisdom," despite data indicating a majority of 2004 voters supported gay
civil unions and that "same-sex marriage had little net effect on the outcome of the
election"). More comprehensive polling data suggests that voters motivated by "moral
values" were not primarily motivated by same-sex marriage. See Thomas Hargrove &
Guido H. Stempel III, Poll: Moral Values a Diverse Concept, PIr. POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 19,
2005, at A2 (reporting on a poll finding child abuse, spousal abuse, and hunger as the most-
cited moral issues, with gambling, homosexuality, and same-sex marriage the least important
to poll respondents).
197 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
198 See Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco Ceremonies,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24; Tatsha Robertson, Civil Disobedience Adds to Battle
Over Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al (discussing decisions by
local officials in six states to follow San Francisco's lead and issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples).
199 See generally Andrew J. Seligsohn, Choosing Liberty Over Equality and Sacrificing
Both: Equal Protection and Due Process in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
411 (2004).
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decriminalize the behavior of gay people and thus legitimize their sexual
orientation as a class. 00 While some courts are distinguishing Lawrence to
its most narrow grounds, the cultural statement made by the decision
sparked a new trajectory for the gay rights movement in seeking full legal
equality on the basis of sexual orientation.20 1 Despite increased political
resistance to gay rights issues, especially same-sex marriage, LGBT
advocates' legal agenda is broader and stands on more solid ground with
the equality principles articulated in Lawrence.
Nevertheless, because of the uneasy traditional association between
sodomy and sexual orientation, 202 the new Lawrence-protected class of
LGBT people is still defined in terms of the former "criminal" class. The
Supreme Court in Lawrence did not start from a blank slate and create
rights for gays out of whole cloth. To the contrary, by negating the
discrimination previously permitted by Bowers, the ostensible scope of
Lawrence was cabined by the contours of the class as it had existed. Where
Bowers had reduced gays to sodomy, Lawrence's articulation of liberty
interests for gays was still couched in terms of decriminalized sodomy.
This allows Lawrence to be interpreted narrowly as just about sodomy,
rather than about an explicit granting of equal rights to LGBT people.
Without question, Lawrence freed homosexual adults from the shackles of
criminality. Because gay and lesbian adults are the largest and most visible
segment of the LGBT population, it might be easy to forget less visible
segments of the population, like youth, who were not so clearly brought
along with this changing legal tide.203 By decriminalizing sodomy, then,
Lawrence effectively advanced gay and lesbian adults as a class (a class
formerly defined by Bowers by the underlying sexual acts assigned to this
population).
When Lawrence is considered together with Romer,20 4 which less than
a decade earlier had found in the equal protection context that animus
towards a defined group of people is not a rational basis for discrimination
200 See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1025 ("[T]raditionalists can no longer deploy the state
to hurt gay people or render them presumptive criminals .... "); Tribe, supra note 19, at
1902-03 ("The Lawrence Court's blend of equal protection and substantive due process
themes was neither unprecedented nor accidental.").
201 See Tribe, supra note 19, at 1945-51.
202 See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
203 For a discussion on the independence of sexual identity from sexual conduct, see
supra Part II.A.1.c. Besides LGBT youth, Lawrence's language of sodomy also leaves out
transgender people, for whom gender identity (not sexual behavior) is the primary defining
trait. Virgins and celibate homosexual adults also do not fit comfortably in this construct.
See Leslie, supra note 18, at 175-76.
204 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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against that group,205 it becomes more apparent that the Court reaffirmed
the doctrine that discriminatory laws against gays are suspect. Those state
actions intended systematically to hurt gays, or to deprive them as a class of
due process liberty interests, cannot be sustained by the will of a
206
majority. No longer, then, can states and courts get away with a cursory
review of a supposed rational basis that only fronts for pure animus. The
Court, strikingly, takes the first step in remedying the history of animus
against gays by cleaning its own house and discarding Bowers, a prominent
symbol of legally-sanctioned homophobia.
3. Why Lawrence's Ambiguity is Legally Problematic for LGBT Youth
(a) The "Minor Exception" in Lawrence
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas concluded
with one powerful paragraph describing what the case did not involve.20 7 In
five brief sentences, it is possible that Kennedy sought to deflect the
inevitable criticism from the right that would be inspired by his sweeping
rejection of the Court's earlier holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, and perhaps
to calm conservatives' nerves that the end of the social order as they knew it
was not in fact in sight.20 8 In putting his argument to rest, Kennedy wrote:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily
be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full
and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.
20 9
205 Id. at 634-3 5.
206 id.
207 See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
208 See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 29, at 1180 (recognizing that while the majority
decision "can easily be denounced as poor judicial craftsmanship.., the Court had very
good political reasons for avoiding transparency in both its reasoning and its rule"); see also
Thomas, supra note 30, at 722 (hypothesizing that the Court included the list of exceptions
"to avoid being accused of judicial activism"). As an indication of the conservative response
Kennedy undoubtedly anticipated, Justice Scalia's scathing dissent trotted out a parade of
horribles he feared would become permissible in light of Lawrence, including "bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity .... " 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
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This caveat paragraph has been frequently cited by state and lower
federal courts seeking to limit the scope of the holding.210 Read in context
with the entire decision, the most likely intent of the minor exception was to
deny adults who sexually molest children a new "privacy" defense to their
criminal behavior, a limitation that bears no relation to sexual orientation.
Unfortunately, courts are misconstruing this caveat to conclude, quite
wrongly, that anti-gay policies against adults can be justified by "child
protection" rationales.
It bears noting that Kennedy opted here to use the imprecise phrasing,
"The present case does not involve," rather than a more concrete statement
such as "the present holding does not apply to" the list of articulated
exceptions. 211  Of course, the case only involved the two plaintiffs-two
adult men-but in dramatically overturning Bowers and rejecting its
underlying constitutional doctrine,212 the majority could not credibly
purport to be narrowly limiting its holding to the facts of the case, nor does
it attempt to do so. Indeed, in the sentence preceding the caveat paragraph,
Kennedy wrote the most famous passage of the decision, "Bowers was not
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.,
213
Despite the Lawrence majority's broad themes of equality and dignity
for gay men and lesbians, several commentators have argued that the
decision's scope is much less expansive.21 4 Indeed, in several early
decisions applying Lawrence, courts have interpreted the decision quite
210 See discussion infra Part III.B. (noting the Kansas and Eleventh Circuit decisions that
narrowly construed Lawrence).
211 Justice Kennedy's pervasive use of vague grammar throughout the majority opinion
in Lawrence has been noted by some scholars. In one analysis, Mary Ann Case postulates
that Kennedy's use of ambiguous modifiers was purposeful in order to, at best, "avoid
say[ing] something tacky or offensive" and to placate both LGBT activists and the religious
right. See Mary Ann Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 Sup. CT. REV.
75 (2003). Case argues that "[t]he majority decision's ambiguity of referents creates-and
may be meant to create-a politics of possibility," while at the same time these "ambiguities
and evasions... make fixing a meaning difficult" and could be used to limit the decision's
scope later. Id. at 76-77.
212 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563, 574-78.
213 Id. at 578.
214 Katherine Franke, for example, argues that despite the "soaring language
recogniz[ing] the dignity and respect that gay men and lesbians are due.... [T]he liberty
principle upon which the opinion rests is less expansive, rather geographized, and, in the
end, domesticated." Franke, supra note 14, at 1401. Thus, "Kennedy's privatized liberty
leaves a wide range of homosexual and heterosexual behaviors and 'lifestyles' subject to
criniinalization." Id. at 1407.
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narrowly.215 The Court itself has thus far declined to weigh in on the
correct reach of Lawrence.2 16
(b) Minor Exception: Minimal Impact
As applied to LGBT youth, the decision's broader themes of equality
and dignity arguably trump the "minor exception." Eskridge, for example,
argued that "Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing more
than, a jurisprudence of tolerance. This means that traditionalists can no
longer deploy the state to hurt gay people or render them presumptive
criminals .... If Eskridge is correct, the decision's statement against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation must apply to LGBT
youth. Moreover, the Lawrence Court seemingly adhered to rational basis
review when considering Fourteenth Amendment claims involving sexual
orientation.218 Consequently, as in Romer, the Court found no rational basis
for depriving gays of their liberty interests-including forming one's own
sexual identity-leading some to point out that Lawrence is essentially an
equal protection decision cloaked in Due Process language. 21 9 The Court
granted gays and lesbians rights much broader than the right to have sex in
private, but rather to define their existence in accordance with their sexual
orientation:
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
215 See discussion infra Part III.B.
216 In early 2005, the Court denied certiorari to two Eleventh Circuit cases in which
Lawrence was narrowly interpreted. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida's statutory ban on adoption by
homosexuals), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378
F.3d 1232, 1238 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (holding that Lawrence did not create a fundamental right
to sexual privacy in a challenge to a statutory ban on the sale of sex toys), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 1335 (2005).
217 Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1025.
218 The standard of review applied by the Court is murky. See Nan D. Hunter, Sexual
Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1528, 1530 (2004).
By deciding the case under the Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court was not forced to define its standard of review. Nevertheless, as Nan Hunter
points out, "the extreme deference of old-fashioned rational basis review has now been
complicated by the Court's recognition that at least some adverse treatment of gay people is
invidious and disfavored." Id. at 1529.
219 See Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and
the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1312, 1313 (2004)
("Lawrence is more of an equal protection case than a substantive due process case. Justice
Kennedy's opinion does not talk about the rights of persons generally as against the state.
Rather, the opinion constantly refers to the rights of 'homosexual persons' and the right of
gays to make 'choices central to personal dignity and autonomy."').
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matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes ust as
heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.21d
Lawrence bolstered the Court's message: discrimination against gays
and lesbians based on hate, animus, the morality of the majority, or political
unpopularity is not a legitimate state interest.221 This "rational basis with
bite" approach now prevents states from relying on any justification-no
matter how illogical, tenuous, or empirically disproved-to pass the rational
basis test for policies that harm gays, if they are in fact merely cloaking
animus. This part of the holding applies to all gay people-including
youth.
To date, there exists little scholarly analysis of the minor exception
itself, although several commentators have briefly considered its
implications. Koppelman, for example, predicted that it will not be a bar to
LGBT youths' rights.222 He noted that although the Court did not explicitly
hold "that there was anything wrong per se with classifications on the basis
of sexual orientation,, 223 the decision was nonetheless "full of language that
demonstrates the Court's concern with the subordination of gays as a
group. ' 224  This expansive language, Koppelman argued, created a
"penumbra" of rights that should prevent discriminatory treatment of LGBT
youth on the basis of sexual orientation.225 Other commentators have
echoed Koppelman's contention that despite the "minor exception" in the
caveat paragraph, there is no rational basis to discriminate against LGBT
youth.226 Indeed, the warning that "this decision does not involve minors"
was targeted not at LGBT youth at all, but to adult sex offenders
(heterosexual and homosexual alike) who would use Lawrence to argue
they had a privacy right to engage in unlawful sexual behavior with
220 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
221 Id. at 577 (applying Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers as controlling reasoning); id.
at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "moral disapproval" of a group is not a
legitimate state interest).
222 See Koppelman, supra note 29, at 1181 ("The singling out of gay youth for such
remarkably harsh treatment would seem to pose a severe equal protection problem.").
223 Id. at 1174.
224 Id. at 1177.
225 Id. at 1177, 1181-82.
226 See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 64, at 684 (noting the exclusion paragraph, but




children.227 Nothing in the language of the exception suggests that because
Lawrence granted gays the liberty to engage in consensual sex, that
criminal child molestation statutes could punish gay defendants more than
straight defendants in child abuse cases because the case did "not involve
minors." In short, the caveat paragraph was intended only to keep
Lawrence a gay rights decision, to prevent claims by sex offenders, rapists,
prostitutes, and other groups who had, as the Court pointed out earlier in the
decision, also been frequently subjected to sodomy prosecutions.228
B. EARLY POST-LA WRENCE DECISIONS CALL LGBT YOUTHS' LEGAL
RIGHTS INTO QUESTION
Some initial post-Lawrence decisions in both state and federal courts
have narrowly interpreted the holding in Lawrence based, in part, on the
exceptions listed in this "caveat paragraph., 229  In other words, what
Lawrence was not has been used by courts to limit the decision's
applicability to contexts other than private consensual sex between adults of
the same sex.23°
So far, several decisions have explicitly applied the "minor exception"
in the caveat paragraph to deny certain rights to both LGBT children and
adults, rather than to the separate class of sex offenders the phrase was
actually intended to exclude. Based on age-old, unsubstantiated myths
about homosexuality, sexual identity, and adolescents' sexual development,
this early set of decisions would appear to suggest that LGBT youth have
garnered no new legal protections in the post-Lawrence world. These cases
are incorrect for two reasons. First, each misinterprets and misapplies the
minor exception to uphold blatantly discriminatory policies where sexual
orientation is the targeted classification. Second, each case uses traditional
rational basis review to find that homophobic stereotypes can be
"legitimate" state interests, whereas under the "rational basis with bite"
227 In one recent case, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly drew this distinction,
holding that "[a]s the Court specifically pointed out, Lawrence did not involve minors or
others 'who might be injured or coerced,' and the conduct protected there was very different
from that [in this case, in which the adult defendant]... took pictures of a sixteen year old
boy masturbating and engaging in oral sex, kept the pictures and then transmitted one of
them over the intemet." United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
228 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569-70 (2003) (distinguishing early in the decision
between sodomy prosecutions for consensual sex and those for non-consensual or coerced
sex, which included "relations between men and minor girls or minor boys").
229 See Thomas, supra note 30, at 728-34.
230 See Hutchinson, supra note 39, at 49-55; Seligsohn, supra note 199; Thomas, supra
note 30, at 728-34.
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standard that emerges from Romer and Lawrence, such stereotypes must be
found to be irrational.
1. Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services
In a 2004 case, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and
Family Services,231 the Eleventh Circuit ignored the holding and spirit of
Lawrence to uphold a Florida law prohibiting gays and lesbians from
adopting children. In Lofton, the court held that Florida's statutes
prohibiting adoptions by any gay person on the basis of their sexual activity
withstood rational basis review.232 The Eleventh Circuit applied the
rational-basis standard, finding that no fundamental right or suspect class
was implicated.233 The decision denied the plaintiffs, two gay men, the
ability to adopt HIV-positive children they had raised for many years as
foster parents, which was permitted by Florida law. 234
In Florida, the legal definition of a "homosexual" is an individual who
engages in homosexual sexual conduct.235 This definition, according to the
Eleventh Circuit, "distin[guishes] between homosexual orientation and
homosexual activity. 236 One prominent "rational" basis relied upon by the
court was protecting children from homosexuality and its ills. 237
Florida courts have defined the term "homosexual" as being "limited to applicants
who are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity," thus drawing "a
distinction between homosexual orientation and homosexual activity."
238
231 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
232 Id. at 817-20.
233 Id. at 815.
234 Florida's contradictory foster care and adoption policies refute its own purported
"legitimate aim" in protecting children's best interests. Christopher D. Jozwiak, Lofton v.
Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services: Florida's Gay Adoption Ban
Under Irrational Equal Protection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407, 414 (2005) ("Florida's
placement of children in the foster homes of gays and lesbians demonstrates the state's
confidence that homosexual families can serve the best interests of children.") (footnote
omitted); see also Mark Strasser, Rebellion in the Eleventh Circuit: On Lawrence, Lofton,
and the Best Interests of Children, 40 TULSA L. REV. 421, 428 (2005) (commenting that in
Lofton, "the state's classification undermined rather than promoted the welfare of the child at
issue, so it was especially difficult to understand why the policy passed muster").
235 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 818-20.
238 Id. at 807 (quoting Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210,
1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff'din relevant part, 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995).
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In formulating its adoption policies and procedures, the State of Florida acts in the
protective and provisional role of in loco parentis for those children who.., have
become wards of the state. Thus, adoption law is unlike criminal law, for example,
where th 9paramount substantive concern is not intruding on individuals' liberty
interests.
Because of Lawrence, the court faced the central issue of whether a
denial of rights to gays and lesbians on the basis of conduct, not identity,
could withstand scrutiny. 240 The court recognized that, as a general matter,
state discrimination on the basis of a classification is constitutionally
problematic. 241 Nevertheless the court held that "[b]ecause of the primacy
of the welfare of the child, the state can make classifications for adoption
purposes that would be constitutionally suspect in many other arenas., 242 In
essence, the court held, policies that discriminate against gays and lesbians
could still be justified on child protection rationales.
In Lofton, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly cited the "minor exception"
to deny adoption rights to LGBT parents. The Court of Appeals held that
simply because Lofton "involved" children at all, no part of the Lawrence
holding was relevant. Twisting the meaning of the exception beyond any
reasonable interpretation, the court effectively turned Lawrence against the
best interests of all children, including LGBT ones.243 As the majority held
in finding one more reason why Lawrence did not bind them to invalidate
Florida's statute that discriminated on the basis of potential gay parents'
sexual acts:
[T]he holding of Lawrence does not control the present case. Apart from the shared
homosexuality component, there are marked differences in the facts of the two cases.
Court itself stressed the limited factual situation it was addressing in Lawrence: "The
present case does not involve minors." .. .Here, the involved actors are not only
consenting adults, but minors as well.
244
The minor exception, intended to protect children from sexual abuse,
was used instead to deny HIV-positive children the love and care of parents
who had raised them because the parents were gay. In Lawrence, Justice
Kennedy explicitly granted gays and lesbians the liberty, like that enjoyed
by heterosexuals, to autonomously make "the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime," which included forming family
239 Id. at 809.
240 id.
241 Id. at 810.
242 id.
243 Id. at 817.
244 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
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relationships.245 It is unlikely that he intended to bar formation by gay
couples of the most meaningful family relationships, including child
adoption, by including the minor exception.
The Supreme Court has previously held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits discrimination against "all persons similarly situated"
without a legitimate governmental interest. 246 The Lofton appellants argued
"that the state has not satisfied [the] threshold requirement that it
demonstrate that homosexuals pose a unique threat to children that others
similarly situated in relevant respects do not., 247  The court found that
"homosexuals and heterosexual singles are not 'similarly situated in
relevant respects. ,,248 Namely, "the legislature could rationally act on the
theory that heterosexual singles, even if they never marry, are better
positioned than homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with
education and guidance relative to their sexual development throughout
pubescence and adolescence. 249
Illustrating the presumption that all children are heterosexual, the court
added lengthy commentary on the importance of heterosexual role
modeling.25° It found that Florida acted rationally in promoting a "broader
adoption policy... designed to create adoptive homes that resemble the
nuclear family as closely as possible," such that the state "emphasizes a
vital role that dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender
identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling. 25' The court, in an
awkward attempt to label Florida's adoption policy "rational," spun this
unlikely scenario of adolescents' sexual education:
Statistically, the state does know that a very high percentage of children available for
adoption will develop heterosexual preferences. As a result, those children will need
education and guidance after puberty concerning relationships with the opposite sex.
In our society, we expect that parents will provide this education to teenagers in the
home. These subjects are often very embarrassing for teenagers and some aspects of
the education are accomplished by the parents telling stories about their own
adolescence and explaining their own experiences with the opposite sex. It is in the
best interests of a child if his or her parents can personally relate to the child's
245 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 506 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
246 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
247 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 821.
248 Id. at 821-22.
249 Id. at 822.
250 Id. at 818-23.
251 Id. at 818. The court found that "it is rational for Florida to conclude that it is in the
best interests of adoptive children, many of whom come from troubled and unstable
backgrounds, to be placed in a home anchored by both a father and a mother." Id. at 820
(citing Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
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problems and assist the child in the difficult transition to heterosexual adulthood
Given that adopted children tend to have some developmental problems arising from
adoption or from their experiences prior to adoption, it is perhaps more important for
adopted children than other children to have a stable heterosexual household during
puberty and the teenage years. 252
Remarkable about this purported reasoning, aside from the mythical
parent-child bonding experience the court paints, is the implicit recognition
that some percentage of adopted children will not become heterosexual. In
acknowledging that some children will become gay, it proceeds to ignore
that they too may have a "difficult transition" to adulthood. By ignoring
their "developmental problems" and needs, the court implies:
discrimination against LGBT adoptive youth is also rational, as they must
have no interest in having a chance to be adopted by LGBT parents who can
"personally relate" to their specific needs. Thus, the minor exception was
used, absurdly, to justify discrimination against LGBT parents and children
alike. 3
According to the court, these rationales justified blanket discrimination
against all potential homosexual parents. 4  Under both Romer and
Lawrence, the "closer look" at the state policies discriminating against gays
would have revealed that the discrimination resulting from Florida's
adoption policy against potential LGBT adoptive parents and against LGBT
adoptive children bears no relation to a legitimate interest, but instead is
cloaked in homophobic myths about gays and child-rearing that are not
rational. Since these myths bear no weight (and Florida's own foster care
policy reveals that the state itself agrees that gays pose no threat to
children), the policy creates a classification solely to discriminate against
gays as a group. This was not rational prior to Lawrence, and it cannot be
made rational by invoking the irrelevant minor exception.
2. State v. Limon
In its 2004 holding in State v. Limon,255 a Kansas state appellate court
joined the Eleventh Circuit in narrowly interpreting Lawrence, holding that
252 Id. at 822 (emphasis added) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Cox, 627 So.2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
253 The fallacy of this application was noted by one commentator, who argued that "to
say that Lawrence does not stand for the proposition that the Federal Constitution protects
the right to have sexual relations with minors is not to say, for example, that those with a
same-sex orientation can be precluded from having any contact with minors or, for that
matter, adopting." Strasser, supra note 235, at 435.
254 Id.
255 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, No. 85,898, 2005 WL 2675039 (Kan. Oct.
21, 2005).
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the "minor exception" in the caveat paragraph excludes LGBT youth from
the decision's protections. In that decision, the court upheld a 17-year
prison sentence for a young man in a state mental health facility who,
shortly after his eighteenth birthday, engaged in voluntary oral sex with a
14-year-old boy who also lived in that facility.256 If the younger boy had
been female, Kansas's so-called "Romeo and Juliet" law would have
applied, subjecting the defendant to a sentence of just thirteen to fifteen
months.25 7 The Romeo and Juliet statute provided that in statutory rape
cases involving voluntary sexual relations between two "members of the
opposite sex" where the defendant is nineteen or under and less than four
years older than the other youth, the defendant would face significantly
shorter prison terms and more lenient attendant penalties, such as reduced
post-release supervision periods and sex offender registration
requirements. 258 Because the defendant, Matthew Limon, was of the same
sex as the younger boy, however, the Romeo and Juliet law's shortened
presumptive sentence did not apply, subjecting imon instead to the
severely long prison sentence and to sex offender registration
requirements.25 9 Limon served more than five years of this sentence before
the Kansas Supreme Court overturned the lower court's ruling in October
2005, finding the disparate sentencing requirements unconstitutional.26 °
On original appeal, Limon's criminal sodomy conviction was upheld
by the Kansas courts, based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers, which was subsequently overturned in Lawrence.261 The U.S.
Supreme Court withheld consideration of Limon's petition for certiorari
until it decided Lawrence in 2003, after which point it granted the petition,
vacated the decision, and remanded the case to the Kansas Court of Appeals
"for further consideration in light of Lawrence v. Texas."2
62
On remand, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that Lawrence was
inapplicable to Limon's case, contending that the "major premise" of
Lawrence was that "[a]ll adults may legally engage in private consensual
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle., 263 On LGBT minors'
256 Id. at 232-33.
257 State v. Limon, No. 85,898, 2005 WL 2675039, at *2 (Kan. Oct. 21, 2005)
(discussing the contested Kansas unlawful voluntary sexual relations statute, Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3522 (2004), commonly referred to as "the Romeo and Juliet statute").
25 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522 (2004).
259 Limon, 83 P.3d at 243 (Pierron, J., dissenting).
260 Adam Liptak, Kansas Law on Gay Sex by Teenagers Is Overturned, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
22, 2005, at A15.
261 Limon, 2005 WL 2675039, at *3.
262 Id. at *4 (quoting Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003)).
263 Limon, 83 P.3d at 234 (majority opinion).
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rights, the court proceeded to find that "children are excluded from the class
that 'may legally engage in private consensual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle,' and all persons who 'may legally engage in private
consensual sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle' are
excluded from the class of children.,
264
Applying rational basis review, 265 the appellate court held that in
drafting the Romeo and Juliet statute to apply only to heterosexual youths,
the state reasonably acted to "prevent the gradual deterioration of the sexual
morality approved by a majority of Kansans. 266  Further, it suggested
sexuality during adolescence was mutable, such that Kansas had a rational
interest in preventing children from developing into homosexuals:
During early adolescence, children are in the process of trying to figure out who they
are. A part of that process is learning and developing their sexual identity. As a
result, the legislature could well have concluded that homosexual sodomy between
children and young adults could disturb the traditional sexual development of
children.
267
In other words, "protecting" children from homosexuality was deemed
a rational basis268 despite ample literature demonstrating that sexual
behavior between teenagers will not impact sexual orientation. The court
continued to postulate a number of other possible bases that could have
motivated the state legislature, all of which it found rational despite citing
no factual findings to support them.269
Perhaps anticipating that these rational bases might not be rational at
all and could thus be found to be discriminatory policies solely based on
animus towards LGBT people, the court explicitly sought to distinguish
Romer and its holding that animus alone is not a rational basis.27°
[T]he Romer Court focused on the apparent animosity toward gay people in enacting
the amendment. The Court stated that the amendment drew a classification "for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."... This subsection of the
statute does not disadvantage gay teenagers burdened by the law. [The statute] is
gender neutral.... [The statute] is based on the conduct of engaging in sodomy with a
264 Id.
265 Id at 236-37.
266 Id. at 236.
267 Id
268 Id. The concurring opinion similarly noted that "at this age a child's sexual
orientation is more than likely not fully developed." Id. at 242. (Malone, J., concurring).
269 These included, curiously, the theory that "lessening the penalty for heterosexual
activity between adults and children may reduce the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
The legislature could well have considered that same-sex sexual acts between males might
increase their risk of contracting certain infectious diseases." Id. at 237 (majority opinion).
270 Id. at 239-40.
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child and not based on the offender's sexual orientation or gender. On the other hand,
in Romer, the challenged legislation concerned the sexual orientation of the class.
271
In essence, the appellate court used the illogical Bowers-like reasoning
that specially burdening homosexual conduct need not burden gay people-
so long as they do not act upon their sexual identity.272 This reasoning was
flatly rejected by Lawrence: despite the appellate holding, courts can no
longer deem rational criminal penalties that would imprison one eighteen-
year-old man for a generation and free another for engaging in similar
conduct, where the fundamental distinction is their sexual orientation.
The dissenting judge rejected the distinctions the majority drew
between the present case and both Lawrence and Romer. Recognizing that
"there are obviously different facts in Lawrence," the dissent found that,
nevertheless, "there are principles that serve as the basis for Lawrence and
the overruling of Bowers which appear to be applicable to Limon's case, '273
namely, that public morality is no longer a legitimate rational basis. 74 The
Romer doctrine, the dissent found,
appears to stand for the proposition that legislation impacting on sexuality is subject
to analysis for constitutionality when it discriminates between different classes or
groups of citizens. This is particularly true in a criminal justice context where the
stakes can be quite high, even when the penalties may not seem great. In the instant
case, where we are talking about many years of incarceration, it is certainly true.
2 75
The dissent concluded that the "the argument that this statute is not aimed at
homosexuals cannot be made with a straight face. 276
In the first major gay rights decision to extend Lawrence's equality
principles, the Kansas Supreme Court in October 2005 unanimously
reversed the appellate court's decision and held that the state Romeo and
Juliet law unconstitutionally discriminated against homosexual youth in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.27 7 The
court found that Lawrence "requires us to hold that the State does not have
a rational basis for the statutory classification created in the Romeo and
Juliet statute' 278 against gay teenagers, and emphasized that after Lawrence,
moral disapproval of homosexuality "cannot be a legitimate governmental
271 Id.
272 See discussion supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
273 Limon, 83 P.3d at 244 (Pierron, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 246.
275 Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
276 Id. at 249.
277 State v. Limon, No. 89,858, 2005 WL 2675039, at *1-2 (Kan. Oct. 21, 2005).
278 Id. at *2.
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interest" in creating status-based classifications.279 Most strikingly, the
court recognized the harmful effects of anti-gay criminal laws on gay youth,
noting that "the demeaning and stigmatizing effect upon which the
Lawrence Court focused is at least equally applicable to teenagers, both the
victim and the offender, as it is to adults and, according to some, the impact
is greater upon a teen' 280 and rejecting the lower court's determination that
the minor exception rendered Lawrence inapplicable to a case involving
children.281 Finally, the court found that there was no credible evidence
"justifying the position that homosexual sexual activity is more harmful to
minors than adults" or "that public health risks for minors engaging in
same-gender sexual relations is greater than the risk for adults."28 2 The
court concluded that, even under rational basis review, the Romeo and
Juliet statute "created a broad, overreaching, and undifferentiated status-
based classification which bears no rational relationship to legitimate State
interests" and was thus unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.283
Lofton and the lower court decision in Limon fabricated rational bases
rooted only in old biases2 84--not actual legitimate interests. With anything
more than a superficial analysis, the child protection interests asserted by
those courts as "rational" are found to be quite the opposite. Instead, they
play into homophobic biases and reach conclusions unsupported by
empirical research and the consensuses of professional communities.
28 5
279 Id. at * 19. The court found that although Lawrence was decided on due process
grounds, the equality principles articulated in the decision also applied to the equal
protection context, noting "the Lawrence decision recognized that the substantive due
process analysis at issue in that case and the equal protection analysis necessary in this case
are inevitably linked." Id. at * 14.
280 Id. at *8.
281 Id. at *15.
282 Id. at *16, *17.
283 Id. at *19.
284 See discussion supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
285 Two amicus briefs on behalf of Matthew Limon were submitted to the Kansas
Supreme Court by medical and psychological groups. The first, submitted by the Kansas
Public Health Association, American Public Health Association, and five AIDS research
groups. Brief of Amici Curiae Kansas Pub. Health Ass'n et al., State v. Limon, No. 00-
85898-S (Kan. Aug. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Public Health Brief]. The second was submitted
by the National Association of Social Workers and its Kansas state chapter. Brief of Amici
Curiae Nat'l Ass'n. of Soc. Workers, State v. Limon, No. 05 85898-S (Kan. Aug 9, 2004)
[hereinafter Social Workers' Brief]. The Public Health Brief urged the court to reject the
exclusion of gay individuals from the Kansas Romeo and Juliet law, concluding,
An objective evaluation of medical science concerning the transmission of sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs), particularly the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), vitiates any argument
that the Romeo and Juliet law, itself, or the distinction confining its reach to "opposite sex"
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While protecting children and preserving public health are certainly rational
interests of the state, arbitrary classifications against LGBT people to
achieve them based on animus and not on fact bear no reasonable
relationship to securing those interests. At worst, they can undermine those
interests by missing real threats to child safety and public health.286 The
Kansas Supreme Court's powerful rejection of these arguments in Limon
offers hope that future courts will similarly reject these harmful
justifications to discriminate against LGBT young people.
C. IMPACT OF L4 WRENCE ON AT-RISK LGBT YOUTH
For those disenfranchised LGBT youth who confront anti-gay
discrimination in their schools, in child welfare, and in the juvenile justice
systems, Lawrence v. Texas offers hope, not despair. The ambiguity of the
minor exception, unfortunately, does provide courts an excuse to deny
LGBT minors rights and protections.287 A reasonable reading of that
exception, however, is that the Court leaves regulation of all youth sexual
activity to the states. This was an issue not explicitly before the Court in
this case and it is unsurprising the Court would have wanted to cabin its
holding to avoid opening the door to broader questions of children's
rights. 2
88
Nevertheless, the minor exception in Lawrence cannot reasonably be
read to justify state-enforced discrimination against youth on the basis of
their sexual orientation that harms them as a class of people. If read in this
way, the decision would effectively provide the already-marginalized sub-
partners, is rationally related to preventing disease. The restriction/exclusion is both so over- and
under-inclusive as a means of preventing the spread of HIV, and is so far removed from any
purported public health objective, that it would be impossible to credit HIV prevention-or
prevention of any other STDs-as its legitimate legislative purpose.
Public Health Brief at 3.
Similarly, the Social Workers' Brief rejected the State's claim that "the Romeo and Juliet
law protects traditional sexual developments" citing "decades of social research and clinical
experience indicate that the law cannot achieve that ostensible purpose." Social Workers'
Brief at 5.
286 See Public Health Brief, supra note 285, at 9-12 (describing the Romeo and Juliet
law's over- and under-inclusiveness, such that the law actually advantages heterosexual
couples engaging in high-risk conduct while disadvantaging same-sex couples for whom no
health risk is present).
287 See discussion supra Part III.B.
288 For an overview of the complex constitutional status of children's rights, see
generally Meyer, supra note 121, at 1117, 1120 (observing that courts are only beginning to
"ready[] themselves at last to deal seriously with the knotty questions posed by the idea of
children's rights"). No doubt, a gay rights decision only involving adult actors is not the
ideal forum for addressing these broader issues.
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class of the LGBT population-youth-fewer protections from
discrimination than LGBT people generally. As the Court labored to
address the history of discrimination against gays and lesbians,289 it does
not logically follow that the Court would endorse such discrimination
against children in the same holding.
Correctly interpreted, Lawrence provides explicit recognition that
LGBT people exist and confront societal discrimination as a class. For at-
risk youth in state child welfare and juvenile justice systems, ample
empirical evidence links the discrimination and harassment they face to
their sexual identity.290 Discriminatory actions by state actors-including
overt anti-gay harassment in detention facilities, differential treatment of
LGBT youth on the basis of their sexual orientation, and placement of
LGBT youth offenders in socially isolated or more restrictive settings-are
all intentional actions made specifically on the basis of juveniles' sexual
orientation. As such, individualized claims of discrimination and systemic
challenges to the maltreatment of LGBT youth in public custody may seek
relief in the Fourteenth Amendment in seeking to vitiate these conditions.
Since Lawrence recognizes that gay people-and, by definition, gay
youth--exist, ignorance of their existence can no longer serve as a valid
excuse for denying equal protection of the laws. Further, Lawrence
undermines the pervasive rationale that discriminatory treatment against
LGBT youth is based on a desire to "protect" them from the ills of
homosexuality. Before Lawrence, gays and lesbians were still presumptive
criminals under the law,291 and "saving" children from a lifestyle presumed
to be criminal could have been construed to be a rational state interest.
With Lawrence, gays and lesbians are no longer criminal and have thus
become legitimate and equal citizens. The past illusion of protecting
children from criminal homosexuals, if ever "rational" at all, has now been
rendered meaningless.
After Lawrence, courts must consider more carefully whether anti-gay
actions are rooted in animus and societal prejudice. Allowing already
stigmatized minors to experience a tortured adolescence-from taunting,
beatings, homelessness, sexual assault, and inappropriate sentencing when
these experiences lead them to crimes of survival--can bear no reasonable
relation to any rational state interest. Even at the most narrow application
of Lawrence's holding-that it applies to adult sex and nothing more-the
decision cannot be used to justify harm to LGBT youth. The language of
equality and the distinction drawn between sexual behavior and sexual
289 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-71 (2003).
290 See discussion supra Part II.A.
291 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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orientation stands on its own to suggest how sexual minorities will be
treated in future cases. A searching analysis of history and expert literature
demonstrates long-standing discrimination faced by gay youth, and this is
no more justified (and, indeed, arguably more loathsome) than the historical
discrimination against adults decried in Lawrence.
So what relief can homeless and incarcerated LGBT youth find in
Lawrence?
First, the decision has helped chip away at societal animus towards
gays and lesbians, and in the long term, improving social attitudes will
make it less likely that gay and transgender youth will be ostracized by their
families and prematurely forced from their homes. The increasing
awareness of gay rights issues, drawn into focus by the attention paid to the
equality principles articulated in Lawrence, may also make child welfare
and juvenile justice agencies more sensitive to the issues facing LGBT
youth under their care.
Specifically, however, Lawrence justifies increased judicial scrutiny of
policies and practices that treat LGBT youth in child welfare and juvenile
justice facilities differently on the basis of their sexual orientation. To the
extent that LGBT youth are victimized by systemic harassment and assault
by staff and other youth, harmed by inappropriate placement in facilities
where they are likely to encounter such harassment, or who do not receive
necessary mental health care, agencies will have an increasingly difficult
time linking such practices to legitimate interests and may be subject to
lawsuits challenging these conditions and seeking damages.292 Finally, to
the extent that homeless LGBT youth were previously denied the
opportunity to be placed with LGBT foster parents because of
discriminatory state policies justified by criminal sodomy statutes,
Lawrence removes that barrier and, despite the discouraging holding in
Lofton, makes it more likely that the most vulnerable LGBT youth may be
placed in caring families and out of the system altogether. While these
possibilities are not exhaustive, they illustrate that Lawrence's legacy for
youth should be a positive one.
292 In September 2005, the ACLU sued Hawaii state officials on behalf of LGBT
teenagers who were confined in a state correctional facility, alleging they were "subjected to
a campaign of unrestrained harassment, abuse and other maltreatment" by staff and other
youth, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint at 3, 6, R.G. v. Koller, No. 05-
566 (D. Haw. Sept. 2, 2005). The lawsuit seeks injunctive relief and damages. Id. at 59-62.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the most
significant legal advance for gay and lesbian rights in American history, put
into jeopardy many forms of state-sanctioned discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Although it fell short of conferring full equality rights
on sexual minorities in the United States, Lawrence was significant for
recognizing that gays and lesbians, as a class, must be accorded dignity and
the right to lead their lives with minimal interference from the state.
While Lawrence has likely done much to advance the basic right to be
gay or lesbian, early decisions interpreting Lawrence have provided mixed
signals on its long-term legacy, particularly as applied to LGBT youth. The
last few years have seen significant advances to combat discrimination and
harassment against LGBT youth, but significant challenges remain,
particularly in the child welfare and juvenile justice systems, where sexual
minority youth still face pervasive and persistent discrimination.
The most discouraging prospect raised by the "minor exception" in
Lawrence's caveat paragraph is that it could continue to justify myriad
policies used to discriminate against LGBT teenagers and to prevent them
from forming critical support networks. As the Kansas Supreme Court
recently held in Limon, however, the equality principles carefully
articulated in Lawrence must apply to both adults and youth. Other courts
should find the reasoning in Lofton and the earlier Limon decisions
unpersuasive when analyzing future cases involving LGBT youths' rights.
Instead, courts should recognize that Lawrence stands for more than
merely striking down antiquated sodomy laws. It signifies, together with
the Court's other gay rights jurisprudence, that sexual identity is a core part
of human existence, and that discrimination on the basis of that identity
must be carefully justified. With the Court's recognition that sexual
identity is part of human life, it becomes impossible to deny that it is also
part of the life of adolescents-adolescents who, in many contexts of their
lives, bear the most harmful brunt of society's animus towards gays.
There can be no rational basis for "protecting" youth from themselves,
when such protections actually cause them more harm than good. There
can be no rational basis for ignoring the special needs of LGBT youth in
courts and in the juvenile detention system. There can be no rational basis
for subjecting LGBT youth to severe abuse and harassment, and ignoring
that their sexual orientation has anything to do with it. Since Lawrence
rejected these justifications for anti-gay discrimination, they necessarily
apply to all LGBT people-including youth. The decision bolsters youth
advocates' ability to fight discrimination against LGBT youth because of
their sexual orientation.
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